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INTRODUCTION
The Honourable Sir Laurence Street.
Chief Justice of New South Wales
In opening this Seminar I should like to comment upon the
importance from the judicial role of this problem of the dangerous criminal.
(‘ourts in this State called upon to pass sentence have always been
conscious of the inadequacy of the existing principles to cope with the
situation of the dangerous person not so mentally deranged as to he a
Governor’s Pleasure prisoner. In most cases all that can be done is to pass
sentence and hope that when the prisoner is released the dangerous
propensities will not manifest themselves in further criminal conduct.
Recently both in this country and in England the courts have recognized
the availability of a principle of sentencing that enables an indeterminate
life sentence to be passed -~ that is to say, a sentence of imprisonment for
life from which the person thus sentenced will only be released when the
responsible authorities are satisﬁed that this course can safely be taken
without danger to the public.
I know that we can all call to mind dangerous criminals of earlier
years who have been released and who then have committed similar
horrifying crimes and been sent back to gaol: persons in respect of whom it
may well have been appropriate to have imposed the indeterminate life
sentence. Such a sentence squarely imposes responsibility on the shoulders
of those who must make the administrative decision “Has the time come when
this man or woman can safely be let out?” — not “Has the time come when he or she
hascxpiated his or her crime?”. I repeat. a question they must ask
themselves is “Is it safe in the interests of the community to let this man
or woman out?"
It must be recognised that the indeterminate life sentence does involve
an inroad into an important aspect of thejudicial administration of our
criminal laws: it introduces at a critical point a non-judicial decision
governing the liberty of the subject. We‘ all know that there are limits to
the pursuit of perfection in judicial proceedings. A court is constrained by
the evidence that is adduced and, to some extent, by the considerations
advocated by each of the two contending parties — in this area the Crown
and the accused. But with all its defects the judicial process is that which is
best calculated to protect the rights of the individual. A public hearing in
which all of the relevant ingredients are canvassed, analysed, and evaluated
in open court, in which the evidence is critically examined, a proceeding
involving the presiding judge stating the reasons for the sentence, and, above
all, the unrestricted publicity of the sentencing process and the sentencing
[act all combine as a great bastion against the exercise of arbitrary power.
The philosophies and approach to the‘parole system that were current
some years ago would have passed over to the Parole Board, an
:nlministralivc authority sitting behind closed doors, the real responsibility
for sentencing in the vast majority of cases. The dangers of that approach
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were exposed in the High Court and the primary responsibility for
sentencing was placed ﬁrmly back on the shoulders of the judges. This was
a significant endorsement of the preferability of the judicial process, with
all its publicity and, admittedly, with its limitations, over the administrative
' process with the closed door and the risk of arbitrary exercise of power Of
course, in abstract theory it would be not only acceptable, but indeed
desirable, to be able to set up the_perfect, all-wise, administrative body to
determine sentences giving full rein to justice, to community welfare and to
human rights Unfortunately no such goal is attainable and an attempt
which' will inevitably fall short of that goal is fraught with the risk of
'~ introducing a system of arbitrary control over the liberty_of the subject It
is for that reason that the courts have set their faces against passingvover
ultimate sentencing responsibility. to parole boards...
There is an exception to this policy of the law in the case of the
indeterminate life sentence. In cases appropriate for the employment of this
principle a criminal can be seen to be dangerous to the community in such
directions and to such a degree that the judicial process of sentencing
should, to some extent, yield its responsibilities, and the person should be
incarcerated for the whole of the term of his or her natural life until the
executive authorities are satisﬁed that he or she can safely be released. In a
sense the indeterminate life sentence involves a combination of the two in
that it requires a judicial determination, based upon evidence in open court,
supported by reasons and examinable on appeal, that the case is one
appropriate for an indeterminate life sentence; thenceforth the length of
incarceration is in the hands of the executive authorities in determining
whether, with due regard to the protection of the public, that man or
woman can safely be let out. This is the‘stage that has been reached by the
courts in the sentencing process in recent years. It points up the relevance
of the subject of this seminar that l have much pleasure in formally
1 declaring open.  
TIIE IMNGEROUSNI‘LSS OF I)/\N(iEROUSNIiSS
Roman 'I'omasic, M./t., I.l..B..
Solicitor and Research Officer, Law Foundation of N.S.W.
Introduction“
'I?!:ough it is generally agreed that one of the functions of the criminal
justice system ought to he to protect the community from unprovoked and
undesiIable violencel there is less concern either for the protection ot those
who might be perceived as violators ol socalled community standards or
lot the criteria used loI determining what is to he delined as threatening.
Norval Morris has observed that one of the most critical problems faced by
those administering the criminal law is that ot‘ adequately conceptualizing
and developing sound processes for determining dangerousness . This
L‘Ultccpltlttllzttllon requires that decisions be made as to what types of
conduct are to be seen as dangerous and as to how certain we need to be
in determining it. such conduct will either recur or occur for the first time.
Implicit in this dilemma is the diflicultyof deciding who is in a position to
be able to provide answers to this real problem. The failure of apparently
well-intentioned “experts" to'provide morally adequate solutions to this
thorny problem raises serious doubts as to the extent to which reliance ought
to he placed upon decision-making about dangerousness. The abdication of
responsibility to these experts ol'ten has such severe consequences for those
over whom ,power .or respousil‘nlity is given that the time has come tor a
major reassessment ol. the control apparatus ol‘ the criminal justice system
as well as the parametels ol our real knowledge about the capacity ol this
system. It will he argued in this paper that too much faith is presently
being placed in the capacity‘of the criminal justice system and its associated
psychiatric back-drop. More specifically, 'it will be argued that arbitrary
decisions as to (Iangerousness made by the gatekeepers of this system. are
harmful to most ot~ those in regard to whom such decisions are made, as
s well as contributing nothing to the protection of society Fonsecjuently. the
notion ol~ dangeIousness as presently applied is pOSIlIVI'Iy dangerous and
ought not be seen as the principal ground for decisions in the criminal
justice system.
* I wish to express my gratitude to Steven'Catt ot‘ the Law Foundation tor his
assistance in helping to locate some of the materials relied upon in this paper.
I. R. 'I‘omasic. Law. I.aw.I'('r.r and the Community .' Some observations from a
survey of community altitudes and experiences. Law Foundation of N.S.W.,
Sydney, I976, pp. 5 II; also see I’. R. Wilson & .I. W. Brown Crime and the
Community. University of Queensland Press. St. Lucia, I973 : 124-30; and Crime
Correction and the Public, N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics 8:. Research,
Sydney. (I974).
'2. 'I‘omasic op (it. pp I I8 for strong evidence that there is a high level of
community tolerance ol discrimination against minorities such as the poor, aborigines
and the young.
It. Morris, Norvalt “Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal” Southern California Law
‘Ix't-I'ir'w. 4| : 536 _:It 53‘) (I968). .
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'. It used to be said that “Better 10 guilty men be free than one
innocent man be wrongly imprisoned”. To a large extent this maxim has
now been reversed so that it is now not unreasonable to say “Better 10
innocent men he wrongly imprisoned than one dangerous man go free”.
Similarly, there is a growing tendency for the traditional legislative view‘
that conduct is dangerous because it is treated as criminal to be replaced by
the notion that conduct is to be treated as if it is criminal because it may
be dangerous.
It is signiﬁcant that society is prepared totolerate dangerous conduct,
such as that of the drinking-drivers though it is not prepared to tolerate
the freedom of persons labelled, for example, as paranoid or suicidal.6 Also,
society is often prepared to reward certain fOrms of dangerous conduct,
such as the prescription of dangerous drugs, whilst prescribing comparable
(non-dangerous) behaviour such as the use of marihuana7. In the bail area,
decisions as to dangerousness are often used to justify certain forms of
detention whilst similar cases are granted bailrbecause money bail can be
obtained by the latter . It is clear that decisions concerning dangerousness
are often made upon the basis of the irrelevant criterion of mental illness,
in the case of suicide attempters for‘ example, and upon the equally
irrelevant criterion of money, in the case Of bail, for example. Despite the
apparent irrelevancy of the notion of dangerousness _. it is persistently
claimed that it has a part to play.
Assumptions regarding Dangerousness '
Because of the credence given to claims that dangerousness is a useful
conceptual tool, these claims need to be examined seriously. To facilitate
such an examination it is convenient to ﬁrstisolate the main assumptions
4. Dershowitz Alan M, “The Law of Dangerousness :' Some Fictions about
Predictions" Journal of Legal Education. 23 : 24 at 25 (1970); and Katz, A.
“Dangerousness : A Theoretical Reconstruction of The'Criminal Law’,‘ Buffalo
Law Review 19 : l at 3.
5. See generally T. S. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry, Macmillan,‘N. Y. 1963 :
85; also see R. Tomasic, Deterrence and the Drinking Driver, Law Foundation of
N.S.W., Sydney (1977).
‘ 6. R. Tomasic', "The decriminalization of suicidal. behaviour in N.S.W.” Paper
presented to N.S.W. Government — Seminar on Victimless Crime, Sydney,
(February 1977). « , v
7,. See generally R. Tomasic, Drugs, Alcohol and Community Control, Law
Foundation of,N.S.W., Sydney, (1977).
8. See generally R. Tomasic, Rail and Pre-Trial Release, Law Foundation of N.S.W.,
‘ Sydney. (1976)
9. Foote, Caleb “Comments on Preventive Detention” Journal of Legal Education,
23: at 48 (.1970)
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underlying the “dangei‘ousness” argument and then to examine each of
these hrieliy. At least a dozen assumptions can be identified. though others
may exist in speciﬁc areas. These assumptions are as follows:
I. “Violence" and “dangerousncss” are assumed to be coterminous.’
'. Some harms are assumed to he of greater concern than o
thers and are
thus more. likely to justify confinement.
'4
4 Dangerousness is attributed to individuals rather than to s
ituations
conducive to such conduct.
4. It is further assumed that application of the dangerousness label can
he perceived in isolatidn from the interests of what for the
sake of
convenience, one may call the powerful. '
'
S. The prediction of dangerousncss is assumed to be possible a
nd a level
of overprediction is assumed to be acceptable.
(s. It is then assumed that it is possible to' rehabilitate or effect
ively treat
those defined as dangerous. ~ 4
7. In the mental health area it is assumed that “mentally ill” p
ersons are
more dangerous than persons not so defined. It is assumed
that
“dangerousncss” is abnormal.
X. It is further assumed that some clear correlation can be made betw
een
mental illness and dangerous behaviour. '
0. Where rehabilitation of “dangerous" persons is felt to be necessary
it
is assumed that this ought to occur involuntarily or in co
nfined
institutions.
10. "the confinement of the dangerous is assumed to be a more
important
consideration than unjust. detention and deprivation of liberty.
ll. Should there be any difficulties in justifying existing criteria of
dangerousness it is always assumed that ways will always be found of
improving these criteria. '
The notion of dangerousness is never brought into question as the
dangeronsness of dangerousness is assumed to be irrelevant.
'l‘liougli exceptions to the above assumptions can be found,
these
assumptions are by no means uncommon, so that each needs to b
e looked
at briefly.
l. Violence and Dangerousness: Before we can deﬁne the dang
erous we
need to be certain as to exactly what we mean by the term dange
rousness.
It is often assumed that when we speak of dangerousness we im
ply that we
are referring to a propensity for violence. Sarbin has argued that t
his is not
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necessarily so as‘ the concepts of danger and violence are not identical as
danger always implies a relationship of relative power rather than
expressing a personality trait”). One cannot reify‘ danger into a personal
attribute simply because a person has behaved violently, as we would then
be indulging in the exercise of prediction with little or no reason for the
prediction to eventuate. Discussions of danger all too often neglect to specify
the nature of the danger, despite the variety of situations to which this term
can be applied. Similarly, the number of situations to which the term
violence can be applied is so great that a simple equation of dangerousness
equals violence is next to being meaningless.
Goldstein and, Katz list ten types of conduct which could. be
considered as dangerous:
(i) Crime for which defence of insanity‘is invoked; '
. (ii) All crime; * ' ‘
‘ . (iii). Felonies; '
(iv) ' ',Crime for which maximum sentence given;
‘ ‘ (v) 'Crimes categorized as violent;
‘ ' (vi) r Crimes that are harmful, physical or psychological;
(vii) Any conduct, harmful or threatening;
(viii) Conduct provoking retaliation;
(ix) ‘ Violence towards self; 4
(x) Any combination of the above.11
Because of this complexity it is not surprising that debate in this area
has been so unirnpressive and that predictions have been devoid of
reliability or validity, however more about this later”. Morris and Hawkins
have observed that there is presently no operable deﬁnition of
dangerousness so that its use is mainly for retributive purposes .
 
10. I. Sarbin, ”The Dangerous Individual 2 An Outcome~of Social Identity
Transformations’.‘ (1967) Brit. J. Crim. 7 : 285. ' '
V 11. ' Quoted by RL. G. Laves, “The Prediction of ‘dangerousness’ as a Criterion for
' ' 1 Involuntary Civil Commitment : Constitutional Considerations" Journal of
Psychiatry and Law 3 : 301—2 (1975). See J. Goldstein & J. Katz,
, “Dangerousness and Mental Illness : Some Observations on the Decision to
.Release= Persons Aoquitted by Reason Insanity” Yale Law Journal 70 : 225. .
12. Diamond, Bernard L. "The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness" The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 123 : 439 at 449-450 (1974); see also
Monahan ibid. 16—17 and Laves, Rona G. “The Prediction of ‘Dangerousness’ as
a Criterion for Involuntary Civil Commitment : Constitutional Considerations"
Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 3 z 291 at 299-304 (1975).
13. N. Morris and G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician ’s Guide to Crime
Control, (1970) Uni. of Chicago Press, Chicago. - '
  
 
l5
3. Which Harms are Dangerous: Because of the imprecision of definition,
selective applications of the notion of dangerorisness have gone uncriticized.
The list of dangerous types of conduct referred to above is of little help in
decisions to conﬁne persons, as each of the categories is of course
problematic upon the social and institutional situation of the offender. For
example, in a recent study of staff decisions concerning whether sex
offenders were committed as dangerous, it was found that staff decisions
were influenced by the offender’s willingness to accept guilt and
responsibility and by his behaviour in the institution. Thus his acceptance ,
of therapeutic definitions imposed upon him was seen as of crucial
significance, whilst the more difficult evaluation of dangerousness tended to
be ignored
It ‘thus seems that where a person’s conduct appears to accord with
the conduct required by control agencies, that person’s possible
dangerousness is not evaluated. However, it has been argued that docile or
‘ compliant institutional conduct does not guarantee that the person will not
. behave dangerously once released '5. -
Yet, as l..cvinson and York found, a person is more likely to be
defined as dangerous if: he exhibits disruptive ‘or disorderly conduct; if that
person is a male and is young and unmarried; has a previous psychiatric,
history and was brought to the attention of the control agency by someone
outside his immediate family 6, It is clear from this that where the
offender is seen as disafﬁliatcd from the mores of the main-stream of
society his conduct is particularly liable to be seen as dangerous. Clearly
this has little impact upon the level Of dangerous conduct in society.
In the final analysis, as DeschoWitz has observed, “the question of
which harms do, and which harms do not justify incarceration is a legal —
indeed apolitical decision, to he made not by experts, but by the
constitutionally authorized agents of the people”.”
I4. ”is, (icorgc l-I. “Determining the Continued Dangerousncss of Psychologically
Abnormal Sex Offenders" Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 3 : 327 at 342
0975); also see Levinson, Richard M., and York, M. Zan. “The Attribution of
‘ll)2lngerousness' in Mental Health Evaluations“ Journal ofHealth and Social Behaviour,
.328 at 334 (I974).
l5. Ko-rol, Harry I... Boucher, Richard .l.. and Garofalo, Ralph F. "The Diagnosis
and 'l‘rcatmcnt of Dungerousness" Crime and Delinquency 18 : 371 at 391
tl‘)72).
lo. Levinson & York supra note 14 81'334 ;Steadman, H. and Cocozza, “The
(‘riminally Insane Patient : Who Gets Out?" Social Psychiatry 8 : 230 at 230
(W73). This has also been the conclusion reached by Rubin. Rubin found that
“the poor, the mentally incompetent. the drifter, and the black are more likely
to be labelled in this way '(i.c., as dangerous) for social reasons
unrelated to any violent behaviour but rather to society’s need to ﬁnd
objects who represent projections of its own violence or who can be
seapegoated for a number of reasons“. Rubin, Bernard “Prediction of
Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals" Archives of General Psychiatry,
27 : 307 at 405 (L972). ‘
l7. |)ersliowit'/...rupra note 4 at 42 (emphasis added).
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3. Dangerous Individuals or Situan‘ons: One of the major stumbling blocks
in the present conceptualization of the problem of dangerousness is the
perception of it as solely an individual attribute. The lack .of theoretical and
practical advance in this field can be primarily attributed to this
individualized conception of dangerousness which is completely inadequate
to the tasks that have been set for this concept. The privatization of
meaning has become a dominant feature of our age despite the fact that
“the structure of what we experience as reality is a reﬂection of the
structures of our society . ...”.18.
It is clear that the sole concentration upon the individual is a futile
one, for as B. L. Diamond has observed:
“I know of no reports in the scientiﬁc literature which are supported
by valid clinical experience and statistical evidence that psychological
or physical signs or symptoms which‘ can be reliably used to
discriminate between the potentially dangerous and the harmless
individual ”.1 .
Because of this concern with individual attributes it is not surprising
that one of the major studies concerned with “The Diagnosis and Treatment
,, . .. . 20
of Dangerousness should concentrate upon indiVidual attributes . Yet,
there is evidence that violence-prone situations are beginning to be
examined“. , However there are few signs that research into
violence-producing situations is receiving serious attention, particularly in
view of the possiblity that dangerousness is only seen as a justification for
treatment. It would be much more difﬁcult for medical control agents to
treat dangerous situations. Until this imbalance in our understanding of
social violence is redressed, so as to accommodate dangerous or
violence-prone situations, the intellectual credibility of claims concerning the
prediction and treatment of dangerousness must remain suspect.
4. ‘Dangerousness” and “The Powerful”: It is noteworthy that the term
dangerousness is rarely applied to the conduct of corporate and
bureaucratic bodies which daily inflict hardship and havoc on the lives of
members of the community. No suggestion is ever made, for example, that
18_. W. Pelz, The Scope of Understanding in Sociology, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
Londoni 1974 : 185. ' -
19. Diamond, supra note 12 at 444 (emphasis added).
20. ' Kozol et al.,.supra note 15.
21. See generally Wenk, Ernst A., & Emrich, Robert L. “Assaultive Youth : An
Exploratory Study of the Assaultive Experience and Assaultive Potential of
California Youth Authority Wards” J. Research in Crime and Delinquency 9 :
171 at 171 (1972). The irony of this concern with individuals is that the
predictive scales thatare used can only inform us about groups so that decisions
in regard to individuals are further deprived of credibility, see e.g. Ginsberg,
Phillip H., and Klockars, Margaret “The ‘Dangerous Offender' and Legislative
Reform” Williamerre Law Journal, 10 z 167 at 182 (1974).
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corporate.criminals ought to be indeﬁnitely conﬁned because of the danger
that they are likely to continue their abuse of corporate privileges. Bail. for
example, is readily granted to‘ corporate criminals though preventive
detention on the basis of dangerousness is common in the case of those
accused of far less serious crimes. Commenting upon one American ease,
I‘ootc observed that rational determinations of dangerousness virtually never
occurs as there are “insuperable bureaucratic administrative and practical
obstacles” to the implementation of a rational scheme of preventive
detention”. Yet there is considerable conﬁdence in the ability to predict
dangerousness. This confidence helps to legitimate intrusions aimed at
greater social control of the powerless by the powerful”. It is thus clear
that “dangerousness” is in reality only an expression of relative power.
5. Prediction and Overprediction: Clinicians often argue that
“Dangerousness in criminal offenders can be reliably diagnosed and
effectively treated”24. It is true to say that the “prediction of violence in
offender pogulations has long been a dream of correctional
decision-makers 5. An assessment of the claims that prediction is possible
will either show this dream to be a reality or what is perhaps more likely,
a disturbing nightmare. Prediction of dangerousness despite the paraphenalia
of scientiﬁc tests often brought to assist this process is ﬁnally a matter of
judgment upon the part of those persons seeking to predict. This is
conﬁrmed by one of the main proponents of dangerousness testing who
argue that though one can apply psychological tests to assisting diagnostic
procedures “ there is no single test or combination of tests that can
predict dangerous acting out"26. Similarly, Halleck has observed that “if the
psychiatrist or any other behavioural scientist were asked to show proof of
his predictive skills, objective data could not be offered"27. Halleck adds
that psychiatric evaluations of dangerousness must be seen as “a matter of
clinical judgment". He rightly concludes that “while such clinical judgments
must he resoected. they are hardly a scientiﬁc basis for indeterminate
commitment"28. We need now to ask what. the consequences of this reliance
upon professional judgments are and the reasons that such reliance goes
relatively unquestioned.
22; lioote, supra note 9 at 49.
23. Wenk, Robinson 1., & Smith, G. “Can Violence be Predicted?" Crime and
Delinquency 18 : 393 at 402 (I972). '
24. Kozol at al., supra note l5 at 37l. See also Rubin supra note 16.
25. Wenk er 0].. supra note 23 at 393.
26. Kozol at a/., supra note 15 at 386; Megargee adds that “no structured or
projective test scale . . . has been developed which will adequately postdict, let
alone predict, violent behaviour“. See Megargee, E. “The Prediction of Violence
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The prediction of dangerousness cannot be perceived purely upon the
bases of the predictive ability of psychiatrists, psychologists and others, as
such a determination also involves legislative and social questions”. Too
often these-wider issues seem to be obsc‘ured or ignored.
One of the major consequences of reliance upon psychiatric judgments
as to dangerousness is that of overprediction. Levinson and York concluded
that psychiatric predictions always seemed to recOmmend institutionalization
despite the fact that these predictions were no better than those derived
purely by chance”. However it is clear that predictions are made despite
the fact that: ﬁrstly, there is little agreement among psychiatrists as to the
validity of predictions of dangerous behaviour; secondly, there are few
reliable objective standards; and ﬁnally, there is little research which clearly
shows that it is possible to predict dangerous behaviour“. It is useful to
look more closely at the ﬁndings from some of the better studies in this area.
The most ambitious study on the prediction and treatment of
dangerousness that has so far appeared.was undertaken over a ten-year
period by Kozol and hisgcolleagues in Massachusetts”. This was a study of
592 violent offenders most of whom had committed sex crimes. Each
offender was subjected to a series of psychological tests and an attempt was
made to reconstruct a picture of his life history. It was diagnosed that 304
were released after completing their sentences. A further 257 were
diagnosed as dangerous, and the remaining 31 offenders wererreleased as the
courts failed to concur on dangerousness. Though Kozol er al found that
they were able to accurately predict dangerousness to a degree this was true
for only 34.7 per cent of those predicted as dangerous. Also, 86 per cent
of those predicted not to be dangerous did later commit a serious assault.
What is disturbing, however, is that despite the abnormally extensive period
of pre-testing, 65 per cent of individuals who were identiﬁed as dangerous
did not commit an offence”. Two out of three identiﬁcations of
dangerousness were thus wrong.
In another series of studies in California, Wenk and his colleagues
were far less optimistic in their conclusions concerning their ability to
predict dangerousness. Their ﬁrst study sought to develop a scale for the
prediction of violence to help in parole decision making. Use of this scale
was successful in predicting violence by parolees in less than 3 per cent of_ the total, of which 14 per cent might have been expected to be violent.
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However, it is again disturbing that 86 per cent of parolees identified as
possibly violent did not commit any violent acts whilst on parole.‘ In a
second study, Wenk (’I a] assigned one out of every five parolees (i.c. 1630
out of 7712) to a “Potentially Agressivc" category However it was found
that “the rate of crimes involving actual violence for this group was 3.1 per
thousand cases (5/1630), compared with 28 per thousand (17/6082)
among the Less Agressive categories”53 .Monahan concluded that there were
326 “false positives" or incorrect identiﬁcations of dangerousness for every
correct identification“. Wenk et al also reported their study of 4146 wards
held by the California Youth Authority.,The focus of the study was on
actual violence. Extensive case histories and background investigations were
undertaken in regard to each subject and a number of tests were
administered. It was found that 95 per cent of predictions (Le. 19 out of
10) ol violence were wrong. These authors conclude that as a result of this
the “quest for an operationally practical prediction of violence from simple
classiﬁcation appears to be futile”
l‘inally, there is a valuable series of studies conducted in New York
after the US. Supreme Court (Baxtrom v Herold, 1966) held that equal
protection before the law had been denied because a person had been
detained beyond the maximum period of his sentence. This case led to the
transfer of about 1000 mental patients from hospitals for the criminally
insane to civil mental hospitals. These patients had been'reputed to be
extremely dangerous. Commenting on the eight38 follow-up studies of these
patients that have appeared to date,'Monahan concluded that;
“All concur in the ﬁnding that the level of violence experienced in the
civil mental hospitals was. much less than had been feared . . . During
an average of two and a half years of freedom, only 9 out of the l21
(released) patients (8 per cent) were convicted of a crime, and only
one of those convictions was for a dangerous act"
34. Wenk el al., supra note 23 at 395.
35. Wenk ct aL, ibid, at 396.
36. Monahan J. “The Prediction of Violence" in Chappell, Duncan and Monahan,
John (editors) Violence and Criminal Justice. Lexington Books, Lexington, 1975
at IX.
37. Wenk or al., supra note. 23 at 397—400.
38. Stcadman and Cocozzo, supra note 16 and Halfon A., David, M., and Steadman
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Psychiarric Quarlerly, 45 : 518—527 (1972); Hunt. R. and Wiley, E. “Operation
ltaxtrom After One Year" American Journal of Psychiatry, 124 : 974—978
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and Iha Law 1 : 189—96 (1973); Steadman, H. and Halfon, A. “The Baxtrom
Patients : Backgrounds and Outcome" Seminars in Psychiatry. 3 : 376—386
(1971); Steadman. Henry J. & Keveles, Cary “The Community Adjustment and
(‘riminal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients : 1966—70” American Journal of
vathiarry 129: 304-— 10 (1972)
39. Monahan supra note 36 at 19, see also Laves, supra note 12 at 313.
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It thus seems that attempts to predict dangerousness err enormously.
There are a number of insoluble explanations of this. Monahan has precisely
summarized at least seven reasons for the massive overprediction that occurs
in all attempts to predict violence. These are: l
“. . .‘(1) lack of corrective feedback to the predictor; (2) differential
consequences to the predictor of overpredicting and underpredicting
violence; (3) differential consequences to the individual whose violence
is being predicted; (4) illusory correlations between predictor variables
and violence; (5) unreliability as a criterion event; (6) low base rates
of violence; and (7) low social status of those subjected to prediction
efforts”. -
Because of the lack of feedback it is easy to believe that, but for the
intervention, the offender would have been violent. There are many
bureaucratic inducements for the predictor to believe this or else to believe
~ that treatment has prevented such possible violence. Because of criticisms by
the media and higher authorities that are made of predictors who
underpredict it is unlikely that the'predictor will do otherwise than “play it
' ~ .safe” and Overpredict massively because, after all, he would face a threat to
his power by underprediction, and incarcerated offenders are little threat to
this power should heove'rpredict. On the other hand the consequences of
overprediction: for the offender may include “treatment” or retribution.
Dangerousness is often seen as only an exercise for treatment so that once
. treatment is commenced the concept of dangerousness is forgotten“. Also,
' as we noted earlier, the ascription of dangerousness may simply be aimed at
controlling or punishing certain types of persons. As we found earlier
various predictive tests are poorly equipped to test violence; those who
believe in prediction will always be able to find some kind of support,
illusory or otherwise, for their predispositions . Another insurmountable
difﬁculty associated with the ascription of dangerousness is that, because of
the extremely low number of actually violent persons in any population
there will inevitably be high numbers of false positives or errors in the
allocation of dangerousness labels.
The extent to which overprediction of dangerousness is inevitable
raises serious questions about the viability of this conception. As we' will
'see later'it is unlikely that technical advances will be able to ﬁnd an
adequate solution to this difﬁculty. , ~
6. _ Rehabilitation of the Dangerous: The concept of dangerousness is often
associated With the notion of rehabilitation or treatment. Though this is not
the plaCe for a critique of the medical model, it is sufﬁcient to observe
that the ideology of treatment has been one of the most pervasive
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influences of recent times“. This is so despite the continge
nt nature of
psychiatric definitions and the ineffectiveness of asS
oeiated stratagems. As
mentioned earlier, the description of someone as d
angerous is often but an
excuse to have him subjected to treatment .
Quite apart from the fact
that treatment becomes a more subtle, and
perhaps less expensive. means of
social control it all too often fails to achieve it
s. objectives of
rehabilitation.45 Monahan, for example has co
ncluded that “confidence in
the ability of mental health professionals to . . . tre
at dangerous behaviour
is largely unfounded"“. To avoid such a conclusion
efforts are made to
define dangerous persons as abnormal or mentally ill.
7. and 8. Mental Illness, Abnormality
and Dangerousness.‘ For the sake of
convenience, the assumptions of mental illne
ss and abnormality may be
dealt with together as they raise essentially similar issu
es. Once a person is
defined as dangerous or mentally ill it is assumed that he ou
ght to be given
treatment as a matter of course . However, des
pite assertions to‘ the
contrary; there is no clear-cut correlation between m
ental illness and
dangerous behaviour”. (ireenland has similarly fo
und that as most
“unnecessary deaths and serious bodily injuries are cause
d by dangerously
sane persons“; violence was not a major feature of mental illness 9
. One
consequence of the association with mental illness has b
een to blur basic
moral and public policy issues and by so doing to .allo
w the imposition of
,_____..____——
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practices which would not be tolerated elsewhere“). Another consequence
of deﬁning all repetitive violent offenders as mentally ill is to reduce the
concept of mental illness to a 'meaningless and redundant tautology“. In a
recent review of the literature dealing with the association of mental illness
and dangerousness, Mesnikoff and Lauterbach found that criminal offenders
“had no higher rates of mental illness than the general population”.,
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that any, firm conclusions as to mental
illness can be drawn in regard to this 'group. However, these authors were
able to conclude that: '
' “studies on the relative incidence of arrests for violent crimes of
ex-mental patients, including those from institutions for the criminally
insane, indicate rates of violence generally below what would have
been expected by professionals, and far lower than society appears to
expect of mental patients”52
In the case of sex offenders, for example, Greenland reported that most
- are “innocuous, inadequate, passive and minor offenders, rather than violent '
sadistic ﬁends”5 3.
In contrast, it is disturbing that there is greater concern about the
dangerousness of a small number of sex offenders than for example the
violence of parents to the children, which so often proves to be fatal.
Resnik found that about 75 per cent of parents who kill their children
showed psychiatric symptoms prior to the killing“. Surprisingly, these
symptoms are ignored. If we examine the 1446 coronial inquiries held in
1976 in N.S.W. we ﬁnd that in only 0.5 per cent of caSes (Le. 78) was a
possible murder or homicide involved. Suicides accounted for about 24' per
cent of deaths, open verdicts for about 9 per cent and road accidents for
over 30 per cent of deaths. What are we to make of these ﬁgures? For one
thing, if we are concerned about violence to 'others we obtain a very‘
distorted perce tion if we affix our gaze to the homicidal. As' Greenland
has observed5 , there is a “conspiracy of silence” about other forms of
violence or of death whilst psychiatric labels continue to be affixed quite
arbitrarily to groups shown to possess a very limited degree of violence. Yet
' the. ascription of dangerousness seems to unreasonably imply that the
offender be. seen as mentally ill. Furthermore involuntary hospitalization is
often felt to be necessary. '
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9. Involuntary (.‘mI/iucment: Dershowitz has observed that ‘fln all
jurisdictions. as a matter of practice, there is a presumption in favour of
ciIIIliIieIIieIIt"56. in Australia, (That'r. ltas argued that the capacity of the
aggressive person to control his outbursts of violence “can often be best
observed in an institution. . .” This is taking a very limited view of the
problem. If the aim of using the concept of dangerousness is to achieve
preventive detention we ought to admit that mental health is irrelevant,
particularl as “mental illness is not an accurate predictor of dangerous
conduct“ . In view of this the illusion that preventive detention is a tool
for anything other than confinement ought to be dismissed. It is a means
of social control pure and simple. The sooner that this is understated the
sooner will it be possible to appraise the effectiveness of this approach.
l0 lv'rcedum or Detention' Our discussion of the overprediction of
dangerousuess leads to what some have seen as the “stark moral issue” in
this debate namely the number of people that we are prepared to wrongly
deprive ol their freedom in an effort to restrain one violent person. Clearly,
the right ot “talse positives” to remain free of unnecessary detention must
become a central consideration60. One can' only conclude, as we have
already seen, that: ‘
“(foiitidcnee in the ability to predict violence serves to legitimate
intrusive types of social control Our demonstration of the futilitv of
such prediction should have consequences as great for the protection
of individual liberty as a demonstration of the utility of violence
prediction would have lor the protection of society”
lt is thus not only a question of “whom shall we trust?", as Morris
has pointed out“, but a question as to “who shall rule?"63. Ultimately the
issue becomes a political one. do we delegate power to a self-appointed
medical hierarchy or is our social system to be a democratic one? Foote
has put this point more strongly: ‘
u . preventive detention . . . is impossible unleSS‘we are willing to
relegate to second-class citizenship some groups of persons in whom
the false positives are going to fall. I ‘think that sort of prediction is
56. Deishowitl. supra note 4 at 32; also see Dershowitz, A. M “Imprisonment by
Judicial llunch - The (‘ase Against Pre-Trial Preventive Detention" The
Prison
Journal 50: l2—22tl970).
57. (‘hal'/.. supra note 47 at ”2.
58. Dershowitz, supra note 4 at 33.‘
5‘). Monahan & (‘IIIIImiIIgs, supra note 40 at ,157.
(It). Monahan‘ supra note 33 at 420.
(II. Wenk I" 0]., supra note 23 at 402.
(:2. Morris. supra note 3 at 532.
h 63. l). ltell The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Heinemann. London 1974: Ch 6.
 
 not only impossible but obviously impossible, and that the debate
about the prediction of dangerousness is a put-on to conceal and,
perpetuate a discriminatory system of justice in the'face of growing
unwillingness from those difficult lower classesto continue to be
treated as mere objects than as humans".
Frankel similarly concludes that: '
. “It is time we realized that even thedangerous person’s liberty ‘.is
invaluable"? - - -
This leads us :to our ﬁnal two assumptions.
ll. Technolog and the Belief in_ Progress: Lest it be thought that the
above criticisms will be overturned by some new technological innovation which
willassist in the predictive process, it needs to be stressed that this is a forlorn
hope, sq that the whole conception of dangerousness needs to be called into
question. ' ~ -
. ‘ Clinicians seem to he possessed of an inﬂated view of the capacity of
science to solve what are essentially social problems 6. Megargee, for
example, optimistically concludes that as:
“it might be possible to demonstrate that violence could be predicted
using psychological tests . quantitative multivariate research should.
proceed in an effort to derive empirically conﬁ%urations of clinical
data that are reliably related to violent behaviour". 7
However, at what human sacrifice ought this to be done? Kozol et a1
lamely state that it is “clear that we must improve our diagnostic and
; therapeutic competence to ensure that . .‘.‘fe’wer non-dangerous persons are
.kept in”“. It is, simply not good en‘origh to argue that predictive methods
“must be improved”.69 Not only has there been a “gross failure” upon the
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part of psychiatric personnel engaged 'in the criminal justice system to
properly distribute their resources for the prevention of crime, their
obsessive. concern with justifying treatment through the stratagcm of
daugeronsness prediction has caused incalcul'able harm. Not only is ther
e
i “little promise for the development of a prediction instrument
that uould
warrant implementation in actual preventative or correctional
programmes . . .” such predictions would ‘be futile 1. ‘
12. The Dangerousness of Dangerousness.’ The uncr
itical faith in the
relevance of the notion of dangerousness must be called into seriou
s
question. There is more than enough evidence to suggest that it is bot
h an
exercise in obfuscation and that by avoiding diseussion of its real function
s
the community is being caused serious harm. Furthermore, the legal system
gains little of value from this conception. The dangerousness of
daugerousness needs to be acknowledged.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to develop a general framework for the
assessment of the notion of dangerousness and of the so-called dangerous
offender. It has been argued that too uncritical an attitude has been taken
. to the assessment of the potential risk 'of offenders and that the‘deprivation
l of liberty solely upon the Spurious basis of dangerousness is both
ill-conceived and an inadequate basis for decision-making. There is a’need
l for a thorough examination of existing Australian law and practice to
determine the extent to which resort to the sloppy notion of dangerousness
is actually the basis for legal controls7. ln I973 the US. National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals argued that
“perhaps the greatest contribution to corrections today would be a scheme
or system that would effectively differentiate among offenders as to their
risk of recidivism or their potential dangerousness to others”73. Whilst this
may be true it is an example of a widespread dilemma in our criminal
justice system. On the one hand there is a widespread expectation that our
legal and correctional system has a role to play in resolving complex social
problems; whilst on the other hand there is a realization that. we
are
70.
7|.
72.
73.
 
ill-equipped to provide such solutions. Yet. as Norval Morris has recently
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observed, there is a “seductive appeal to drawing a distinction between the
dangerous and the non-dangerous and conﬁning imprisonment to the
former”7 . I cannot but agree with the view of Canadian Law Reform
Commission which has perceived this problem in the following terms:
- ".‘A - system that assumes too much in the imposition of penal
. sanctions commits not only technical error; it errs also at the basic
level of 'values, a level at which no system that seeks to have inward
force can afford to be found wanting”
Clearly other criteria than dangerousness for decision-making must be relied
upon. The benevolent purpose f of decision-making upon the basis of
dangerousness does not guarantee beneﬁcent results“. Instead the
“dangerously expansive rubric” of the notion of dangeroUsness allows those
who are .punitively inclined to classify within it virtually all of those who
ﬁnd their way into our penal system". The imprecision of this concept,
and its use to avoid the realization that much of our penal and sentencing
policies have failed, cannot be justiﬁed except perhpas by political
motivations. . ’
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Roman Tomasic, MA, LLB.
I wish at. the outset to congratulate the Institute for arranging to hold
this seminar upon an issue that is clearly fundamental to a whole range of
areas which our criminal justice system has to deal with at the present
time. Normally the subject of dangerousness is dealt with in rather an
emotional way. Hopefully, a seminar like .this will serve to assure that it is
dealt with in a far more reasonable, detailed and sensible way than it is
normally treated in the press and in general discussions.
The basic thesis that l have advanced is that the notion of
dangerousness ought not to be seen as the principal ground for decision
making in the criminal justice system regardless of the area that is being
dealt with. Throughout the paper i make reference to a number of-areas
(such as hail, probation, parole. etc.) in which dangerousness is seen as an
important criteria for decision making. I have tried to come to terms with
the various assumptions which ,I see as underlying the whole issue of
dangerousness, because unless this. is done one cannot divorce oneself from
the emotional undercurrent which is so often associated with discussions of
the area of dangerousness. l have arbitarily selected twelve assumptions (see
pages 12 and 13) which I regard as being fairly fundamental in all areas
where dangerousness does arise. There are certain areas in which exceptions
will emerge where some of these assumptions obviously do not apply but ‘
basically I have tried to set up the theoretical framework for the
examination and application of the concept of dangerousness.
There is a major difﬁculty i think in a debate concerning
dangerousness due to the failure to develop adequate deﬁnitions of exactly
what is dangerous behaviour. The contingency of deﬁnitions is obviously a
major problem in the criminal justice system and it tends to emerge very
clearly in deﬁnitions of dangerousness and the application of the deﬁnitions
of dangerousness. Deﬁnitions tend to be exceedingly imprecise and applied
rather selectively so that one needs to call into question the whole process
whereby definitions are both formed and applied. In the ﬁnal analysis, in
looking at the process in which deﬁnitions are applied, it seems that where
the defendant’s conduct in some way accords with the deﬁnitions of
control agencies, then that person’s dangerousness is not evaluated. However,
when there is obviously some difference between deﬁnitions of the control
agency and those of the offender, there is far greater concern for that
person’s conduct. ‘
A major aspect of the literature is that there is an excessive
concentration upon dangerous individuals, and this has been one of the
'major blockages to a more sophisticated theoretical development in this
area. The concern with individual danger0usness has tended to ignore
conduct by organizations, bureaucracies and so on, which in certain
situations are far more dangerous to the community, to society at large and
to individuals in that society. Persons at the present moment are more
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likely to be labelled dangerous for social reasons quite unrelated to violent
behaviour, and the concentration upon the individual tends inevitably to be
associated with some kind of stigmatization and scapegoating of the
individual involved. I think that this is the inevitable by-product of the
concentration upon individuals rather than upon situations which produce
violence, and, as I said earlier, the major stumbling block to theoretical
development in this area. A more accurate or valuable appreciation of the
problem is to be gained by examining violence producing situations.
Probably the fundamental area in the whole debate concerning-
dan’gerousness is that concerning the 'question of prediction and
overprediction of dangerousness. I think all the studies that I have come
across seem~to be quite clear in their conclusions that it is not very easy to
predict dangerousness with any sense of accuracy. In the worst situations
something like -only- 3 per cent of attempts to scientiﬁcally predict
dangerousness have been found to‘ be accurate; this varies however,
depending upon the actual type of behaviour being examined. My major
conclusion from examining the literature is that the so-called experts who
see themselves as charged with the task of predicting dangerousness, i.e.
assessing the likelihood of a particular individual to behave dangerously in
the future, have failed grossly to come forward with any reliable criteria for
the assessment of dangerousness.
There is very little agreement amongst psychiatrists as to the validity
of their predictions of dangerousness, and, furthermore, there is little
research that shows that it is possible to ‘predict dangerousness with any
accuracy. In the paper I examine in more detail some of the studies that
have attempted to examine the possibility of predicting dangerousness and
give some of the reasons for what is invariably a massive overprediction
(page 20). ‘
Another argument that has often emerged in the literature is that the ‘
belief that it is possible to predict dangerousness is often simply an excuse
for the introduction of offenders into some kind of treatment programme,
and _so the whole dangerousness notion is itself an irrelevant notion because,
in fact, it is .,the desire to subject persons to some kind of rehabilitation
which is really the primary motivation of persons who are charged with the
task of prediction. I think that it is fair to say from an examination of
literature that. the whole rehabilitative ethos has become subject to
cOnsiderable pressure and criticism in recent years so that there are very
few psychiatrists or‘experts who would claim that they can guarantee the
so called rehabilitation of offenders, and I think that rehabilitation as a
justiﬁcation or assumption underlying the ,urge to deﬁne persons as‘dangerous must be considered spurious.
There is no clear cut correlation between mental illness and dangerousbehaviour (page 21 ) though it is often assumed that this is the case. This isparticularly clear in cases of attempted suicide where it is invariablyassumed that suicidal persons are mentally ill in some way, though this hasnever been shown to be true in the vast majority of those persons whohave been committed for suicidal behaviour (though obviously there aresome cases in which it is clearly the case). '
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I think in the ﬁnal analysis the illusion that preventive detention is
a tool for anything other than conﬁnement ought to be dismissed — it is a
means of social control and nothing' else. We ought to realize
this, even
though it may be unpalatable, but this conclusion is fairly clear f
rom the
studies that l have examined. V
Finally it appears unlikely that new predictive tools will be develo
ped.
The literature is full of optimism that it_is possible to develop new cri
teria
and approaches for prediction, but after' many years of attempts
to do so,
the faith in scientiﬁc prediction, which clearly is evident in many of
the
studies. has been shown to be quite untenable. For this reason I t
hink we
must ‘come to the conclusion that 'the whole notion of dangerou
sness is
somehow suspect, and I' hope that in the discussion we will be
able to
apply this to particular areas. ' - ‘ '
 I THE EVALUATION OF DANGEROUSNESS:
PROBLEMS FOR PSYCHIATRY
Dr w. E. Lucas, MB., 3.5., 0.1m, Dip.Oim.lCantab.), M.A.N.Z.C.P.',
Senior Lecturer Forensicljsychiatry, Faculty of Law, The University of Sydney
It was decided to have only' two speakers at this Seminar as the main
issues, or at least the ones which excite the most discussion, could be put
to the audience'most easily this’way. The ﬁrst paper by Mr Tomasic has
given a broad overview of the problem covering legal and research aspects
and emphasizing the civil liberties issue. I ﬁnd the format and content of
his paper most helpful as it allows me to present the sort of paper l think
.a psychiatrist should on this occasion. For a variety of reasonspsychiatrists
are intimately involved in the assessment of the risks that their patients
present to themselves as well as others, and psychiatrists are the people who
are frequently expected to provide answers to courts, administrators and
politicians on the dangerousness of individuals. Mr Tomasic’s paper will have
made it obvious that this is a clinical rather than a scientiﬁc task and is
fraught with difﬁculties. Psychiatrists who for one reason or another must
provide some answers about an individual’s dangerousness receive little
assistance in the way of deﬁnitions and guidelines for assessment from those
who ask the question.
Some years ago when I began to read on the problem of
dangerousness I had vague hopes that -I would come across some approach
which would be 'of great assistance to me. Like others I wondered whether
psychological ~testing, rating scales or other scientiﬁc instruments might
eventually be developed to assist in assessment. 1 have been disappointed
and my views are very much in accord with those of Mr Tomasic. In 1972
I wrote an Editorial on dangerous offenders for the Medical Journal of
Australia1 ' which concluded by suggesting that administrators and
psychiatristswere probably not the best people to make value judgements
on behalf of the community about what conduct was considered dangerous
enough to justify repressive or therapeutic measures. It was also said that
science appeared unlikely in the near future to provide assistance in the
assessment of dangerousness and that it was important that we look at our
practices in this area and accept the view that the minimizing of
deprivations of liberty was an important criterion for judging the
effectiveness of release procedures for patients and prisoners.
In this paper it is accepted that an adequate deﬁnition of
dangerousness is not available and that prediction is an unscientiﬁc and
inaccurate procedure. If one reviews many of the psychiatric writings on the
subject it is found that experienced psychiatrists in this ﬁeld usually accept
this point of view and are very conscious that they and the authorities
deciding on the release from custody of offenders and patients frequently
err on the side of over-caution. Much of the literature is anecdotal in
inatUre but this is not without value as 'it is a way of sharing experience
 
1. Medical journal of Australia, 1 .2 l, (1972).
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when there is frequently little scientiﬁc basis for the judgments which have to
be made. Also the anecdotal approach is difficult to avoid because many of
the crimes which arouse concern are not particularly common, some of the
offenders are distinctly unusual and any one psychiatrist's clinical experience
of the more difﬁcult cases is likely to be severely limited.
It can also be noted that much of the psychiatric literature concerns
events involving persons who are clearly psychiatrically ill, whereas
the
psychiatrist who works at any level in the criminal justice system of
ten has
to assist in the assessment of’ people who have no significant history
of
psychiatric illness, but who have committed a serious offence or show w
hat
are considered to be serious personality problems.
If it is accepted that dangerousness is by and large ind'eﬁnable and to
a great extent unassessable in any reliable fashion it must also be accept
ed
that the task of assessing certain types of danger presented by patients a
nd
offenders is an inescapable task. It would be quite dishonest to suggest t
hat
estimates of a person’s dangerousness are not made at all levels in the
criminal justice system 'whether or not the fact that this is being done
is
made explicit on each occasion. lt has been said that it is an important
issue in decision making at all levels in the criminal justice system and it is
certainly a daily task for many psychiatrists practising in a wide variety of
situations. ~
For a psychiatrist in private practice, in a general hospital or: a
psychiatric hospital decisions have to be based on clinical judgement about
the likelihood that the patient will do something harmful to himself or to
others. Many psychiatrists would assert that there are useful clinical
guidelines'for the assessment of suicide potential and in some cases
homicidal potential. There are a number of “at risk” groups and patients
falling within these groups who require careful scrutiny. In a later section
some of these will be briefly mentioned. The task is inescapable and in the
clinical situation it could be considered irresponsible not to consider
likelihood of harmful conduct occurring and using one’s opinion as part of
the information necessary to decide on the management of a particular
patient. The safeguarding of the patient’s rights is naturally of crucial
importance but in practice many problems are avoided by an open and i
f
necessary direct approach in dealing with the patient and in consulting
with
relatives and legal advisers.
if the foregoing remarks are accepted we might ask what are the
clinical responsibilities of a psychiatrist who cannot always opt out of
attempting to form-an opinion on this indeﬁnable, unassessable entity called
“dangerousness”. In the clinical situation as well as where someone is being
considered by the authorities for release the problem is always an in
dividual
one. Of course, ﬁnal decisions to release by administrative and political
authorities will be inﬂuenced not only by the characteristics of the
individual but also by an assessment of other risks related to policy and
practice and past unfortunate experiences related to errors of judgement or
chance occurrences.
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The ﬁrst responsibility of a psychiatrist I believe is to carry out 'a full
assessment in an open and honest fashion and to make certain that the
referring authority. makes its concerns and reasons for referral clear. One
must be in a position to discuss all the issues in a straightforward manner
.with the individual being assessed and poor referral practices can make this
very difﬁcult. ‘
Further it is important that the psychiatrist’s clinical approach take
into account the real difﬁculties of deﬁnition and assessment and the relevant
research in this area. Lack of experience or failure to establish rapport with
a patient should result in referral to and consultation with other specialists
or agencies. Also assessment cannot be done without enough time and full
information. There is a need for the psychiatrist to be aware of the realities
of the setting in which he operates and of the sort of standards which seem
to be applied by administrative bodies, the courts, parole boards and so
forth. Without some guidelines it is very difﬁcult to provide answers or to
suggest what questions need to be answered perhaps by other individuals or
agencies. -
It is unlikely that the psychiatrist, let alone anyone else, will cemeup
with a clear estimate or measure of dangerousness in the majority of cases.
There aresome people who are clearly most unlikely in the normal course
'of events to present any danger to themselves or others, and there are a_
rare few who must be considered very dangerous both in terms of the
likely harm that will be done and in the probability that it will occur.
Many in this latter group provide no real problem in assessment as their
record of dangerous behaviour and frequently statements they make about
their future intentions make that assessment fairly 'simple. It seems to me
that in many cases the psychiatrist can give useful opinions regarding ways
in which the likelihood of dangerous conduct can be reduced even if the
probability of its occurring cannot really be estimated. Also advice can be
given about how a person in custody can be given greater freedom and
opportunities to demonstrate changes in attitude and trustworthiness while
being considered for release. In this way authorities can be assisted to
confront difﬁcult problems and to accept that careful risk-taking and
reviews -of progress will demonstrate that many persons considered
dangerous present much less risk than originally thought. The institutional
arm of the criminal justice system is usually peculiarly unsuited to allowing
individuals to demonstrate changes in attitude and behaviour particularly in
the areas of 'initiative and self control.' It is also important that the
psychiatrist indicate very strongly that in some cases the problem is not a
psychiatric one and cannot be solved by a series of psychiatric reports. It is
also important ‘to emphasize that it is not possible to predict what future
life events look in. front a patient or prisoner, and that no 'method of
supervision or treatment can eliminate all the risks involved here.
Finally the psychiatrist has a responsibility to be aware of the bias
produced by his‘ personality, life experiences and the setting in which he
works. He needs to be honest with his patient especially as the patient’s
opinion about his own dangerousness is often valid and his ideas about the
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likelihood of future life events occurring and the effects that they may have
on his. conduct can be most helpful. A surprising number of individuals give
very frank information when they know you are attempting to assess the
risk they pose to others. On a few occasions I have accepted assurances
from prisoners that there will be no repetition of previous alarming and
dangerous conduct even when there is really no other reason for optimism.
I can give no idea why I accepted assurances from these prisoners but
fortunately they have not disappointed me. '
A Clinical Approach
It should be emphasized that although a clinical approach to the
estimation of dangerousness will not in most cases result in a clear opinion
about the probability of future dangerous conduct by an individual it is at
least an attempt to make' certain that signiﬁcant information is not
overlooked. All too often serious risks are taken'with, for example,
psychiatric patients because important questions were not asked. It is easy
to take a history which does not confront the individual about conduct
which may be particularly relevant to future dangerous behaviour. Clinically
important predictors which are emphasized frequently are previous dangerous
conduct, abuse of alcohol and psychopathic behaviour. Quantiﬁcation of
behaviour in these areas is obviously difﬁcult but if no attempt is made
valuable information is lost. Some people do not like asking about violence
and aggression in their patients, may accept denials of abuse of alcohol
When there are signs it occurs and‘may not enquire fully about antisocial,
lhiptilsive and irresponsible conduct. ‘
McDonald2 in suggesting an approach to the evaluation of
dangerousncss in his Psychiatry and the Criminal suggests eight headings for
enquiry. For emphasis I usually add a few more although in reality they
can be covered by the ones put forward by McDonald. I will simply list the
headings and those interested can read the original material.
1. ' Dangerous behaviour. .
Age. Sex. Race (cultural'factors).
Psychiatric diagnosis. '
Dynamic diagnosis.
Recent stress.
Victim behaviour.
Resources.
m
N
F
U
-
P
P
’
!
"
Prospects for treatment.
2. 'Mel)onald .l. M.. Psychiatry and the Criminal: A guide and psychiatric
examinations for the criminal courts. (3rd Ed.) This edition contains much
helpful information on the clinical assessment of offenders. (Springfield, lllinois;
Charles C. Thomas, l976).
 36 __
The headings I like to add for emphasis are:
Abuse of alcohol.
Ownership and use of weapons and particularly the carrying of
, weapons for protection or other purposes.
In' appropriate cases exploration of aggressive fantasy life and whether
in‘ any way the fantasies have become reality or whether ‘it is planned
that they become so. ‘
Fighting behaviour and attitude to it in cases where the person is
frequently physically violent. Some people see themselves as being out
of control at times and may be strongly 'motivated to seek assistance
and treatment.
It is significant that the ﬁrst item on McDonald’s list is dangerous
behaviour. Failure to enquire in, this area is a common and a most
unfortunate error. Properly interviewed people will talk about their
aggressive conduct just as they will talk about their sexual activities if
approached in the right way. .
There is‘something to be said for recalling the old “who, what, when,
where, how, and why" of journalism when assessing the capacity for
dangerous conduct. This assists in deciding what can be done, if anything
need to be, 'in'order to control the behaviour causing concern, provide
treatment or obtain the co-operation of the individual and others. It also
helps to decide who should take the responsibility for any action which
needs to be implemented and sometimes who must make the decisions.
Some particular clinical problems deserve mention. Great care must be
taken to obtain 'as much independent information on the individual as
possible by the way of documentation, discussions with the members of
appropriate agencies and by interviews with relatives. While it is important
to gather such relatively objective information it must not be forgotten that
subjective factors in the assessment may be of vital importance. For
example the responses of the interviewer to the individual and the hunches
and feelings he develops may be decisive in the ﬁnal assessment. Clinical
experience and knowledge of oneself are factors 'Which .cannot be
discounted. A clinical problem which may be of great importance and
present great difficulty from time to time is the assessment of the patient’s
fantasy life. Although there are no clear guidelines here suggestions about
this problem.have been made previously. It is my belief that lack of
information, lack of enquiry and the failure to form an honest relationship
with the patient are the sorts of things which may result in an opinion
which either places the public. at risk or- needlessly deprives an individual of
his liberty.
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When one is expected to include in report some reference to the
dangerousness of a patient or offender it is important to indicate any major
uncertainties in the assessment and particularly to point out deficiencies in'
the information available. As I have indicated earlier precise estimation of
dangerousncss is unlikely but it is- often possible to suggest ways in which
behaviour can be tested and risks reduced. These ways should'be spelled
out and precise practical suggestions made. If the problem is seen as not a
psychiatric one this should be stated and if no estimate of dangerousness
can be made or helpful suggestions given this should be made very cle
ar. It .
is sometimes important to say in effect “I don’t know, and nor do you" to
the referring agency.
, important Clinical Presentations and Amt-Risk Groups
It may be helpful to simply list some broad groupings of patients and
offenders where significant risks are involved although only for a minority
of the persons presenting. To take strenuous measures'in all cases would be
quite unacceptable to the individual, the community and to the hospital
and criminal justice systems. With somegroups research has provided usef
ul
information and with others there is a wealth of clinical experience. The
decision about how to manage an individual case remains a clinical problem.
A list of common presenting problems follows: 4
l; Depression.
‘2. Suicidal threats or attempts.
3. Paranoid illnesses.
4. Homicidal threats.
5. Morbid jealousy (delusions of inﬁdelity).
6. Battered babies and battered wives.
7. Severe marital‘discord other than items 5 and 6.
8. Abusevof alcohol and drugs (especially aphetamines).
9. The patient who is troubled by violent impulses or sadistic fantasies.
ilt). I’crsdns with a history of aggressive behaviour who are in very
.stressful situations and perhaps abusing alcohol.
II. Persons who have committed a violent act perhaps in a way whi
ch is
out of character.
I2. ‘(jases where there is the possibility of aggressive sexual behaviour.
 
 13. There are many other presentations which provide problems in
assessment. Courts refer for sentence many people where the element
of danger is one of 'the reasons for referral and a psychiatrist needs to
be aware that the court is concerned about this although the question
is often implicit rather than explicit. Some, but not all of these cases
involve the question of mental illness, but inexplicable and sometimes
bizarre crimes are sometimes committed by apparently rather normal
people in unusual or very stressful circumstance . ~
The prisoner who is being considered for release can provide very
_ difﬁcult problems in assessment because the assessment may be removed by
many years from the event which put him in prison and sources of
information may be hard to come by._Also the picture may be clouded by
prison, ' conduct reports which are frequently overvalued by releasing
authorities. 'Any prison'psychiatrist can think of badly behaved prisoners
whowould present no risk in the outside world but whose prison conduct
is largely a product of the environment, and also 'think of model prisoners
who present very serious threats to, the community. A not.uncommon event
in the psychiatric assessment of prisoners for release is to leave it until'too
late 0r sometimes not to do it adequately if at all.
Although this paper has emphasised the clinical nature of a
psychiatrist’s task in estimating dangerousness it should not be thought that
the task is primarily a psychiatric one or that a psychiatrist’s opinion
shouldbe sought in all cases. Nor should it be thought that the psychiatrist
has any particular knowledge of commtinity standards as far as
dangerousness is concerned. It should be appreciated that most psychiatrists
are. acutely aware of their limited skills in this area but that they know the
task is often inescapable. .. ..
As the law and scientific investigation offers little for the psychiatrist
in the way of deﬁnitions and guidelines the task of estimating
dangerousness remains clinical and it should be gone about in a thorough
and open. manner with all the limitations acknowledged. I believe that
individuals affected by decisions concerning their dangerousness should have
every opportunity_ to question opinions and decisions and that adequate
review is an essential part of the process.
Finally‘ it should not be forgotten that sentencing and parole practices
as ,well as institutional factors may be important in producing inmates
considered dangerous by the authorities. Environmental influences
contributing to dangerous conduct, or the threat of it, do not stop at the
prison gates.
 39'
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr W. E. Lucas
For nearly ten years now i have been involved in a variety of ways
with the criminal justice system in this State and I have formed a variety
of impressions and had a variety ,of experiences. I notice the passage of
time because I see at Long Bay 'Gaol men on whom I have written
pie-sentence reports who received long sentences and are still there, and I
am still going there, so that I come to believe that weeare “doing time”
together. Mr Tomasic has given a comprehensive review of the literature and
my paper is based. on personal ideas and some impressions that l have
gained.
Psychiatrists, as I point out early in the paper, receive very little
assistance or guidance when they have to assess the dangerousness of an
individual: neither from scienCe nor from the authorities. FiVe years ago,
drawing on the writings of others, I concluded that science did not look as
though it was going to help us very often or very soon in the assessment of
dangerousness and that we should really look at our practices from the
point of view of minimizing the deprivation of liberty of individuals, and in
fact using this as a criterion for the effectiveness of release procedures for
patients and prisoners. I accept Mr Tomasic’s view and the view of so many
writers that there is no real deﬁnition, of dangerousness, and that we are
poor at predicting it. If you look at the writings of psychiatrists, some of
whom are very experienced men in thefreld who have the responsibility of
rtinning institutions for persons considered by their communities to be
extremely dangerous and likely to repeat their offences, they show that
these experienced men are conscious of using overcaution in release policies.
and Mr Tomasic refers to studies which point this out very clearly.
One of the problems facing psychiatrists in the criminal justice system
as against those who work in psychiatric hospitals is that we do see a lot
of people who have no significant history of psychiatric illness, and, when
interviewed, do not give any evidence of having one. They may have a host
of problems and they may have unusual personalities but they are not
schizophrenic or anything like that. Of course, there is a temptation there i
suppose to opt out and say “Well, it isn’t really a psychiatric problem” but
the result of that in the prison system may be that nobody has a good
look at the patient — and I certainly know cases where this is so. A
psychiatrist has at times to consider himself working more in a social work
capacity. -
Although dangerousness cannot be deﬁned or assessed, we are stuck
with having to consider it in a clinical sense. If we say that dangerousness
cannot be defined and cannot be assessed we may be hiding the fact that
people think of it all the time from bail to sentencing, to classiﬁcation in
prison, to consideration for inclusion in minimum security prisons and
special programmes and to release. So we must not hide the fact that if
psychiatrists do not think of it, someone else is certainly going to think
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about it. The psychiatrist working in a hospital or in private practice is
doing this all the time with patients. He is not necessarily thinking of
dangerous conduct, he is probably thinking of harmful conduct: something
that the person might do to harm himself, something injurious to. his
family, his career, or something like that. He has to make estimates all the
time about the consequences of the patient’s illness and actions which may
spring from it. Of course, the safeguarding of a patient’s rights is very
important. In many situations this is not difﬁcult because many patients are
co-operative and are worried abouttheir conduct. If you are fairly open
and direct in your approach to the patient and relatives you do not
necessarily have much trouble.
I draw attention to the clinical responsibilities of psychiatrists in
, assessing dangerousness, but others may be critical of- my comments. I say
it is always an individual problem. You are worried about the person in
front of you, 'not about people like him but about the person in front of
you. This is not seeing the individual aSide from his setting, and .as Mr
Tomasic pointed out the setting, the context, is very important as far as
dangerousness is concerned. Dangerousness must not be seen as just an
attribute.
The psychiatrist needs to be aware that many events may affect his
judgement: an unfortunate experience in the release of other persons, the
policy of the institution, the policy of the releasing authorities and so
forth. You have to be’open with the patient about what you are doing. If
you are assessing someone for dangerousness he ought to know that you are
doing this. Most people know that you are concerned about their future
conduct and often respond very honestly to enquiries about what they are
.likely to do in the future. Some of them, of course, are extremely worried
themselves. This sort of assessment is not helped if the reasons for referral
are not made .clear to the psychiatrist, and certainly not helped, as happens
on' occasions, if the psychiatrist is asked to see somebody and the reasons
for' seeing him‘ are not disclosed. That has happened to me on a number of
occasions over the years ~ I think I upset some people once by explaining
to the patient very clearly why I was seeing him which came as a surprise
to him but resulted in a very clear assessment of the problem.
It is unlikely in most cases that. the psychiatrist will come up with a
clear assessment of dangerousness in an individual. However, a careful
assessment will enable him to make recommendations which may reduce the
likelihood of future dangerous conduct, if there is going to be any, and
may suggest ways to the authorities to test out the person so that they
become more confident about his likely behaviour in the future. In the
paper I give an outline of one psychiatrist’s idea of the matters that should
be enquired into (page 37).
One of the problems, of course, for a psychiatrist trying to assess
dangerousness in a prison is that the prison system is peculiarly unsuited for
testing out people especially if the authorities are particularly nervous about
the individual, or he falls into a category that I like to 'call “dangerous to
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the administration”. They are worried about him~for a vari
ety of reasons
and do not particularly like to give him a little bit of rope.
It is important
to ‘say that at times psychiatric reports will not solve the pr
oblem and that
the only Way that a decision can be reached, is by letting t
he person work
in different situations, allowing him out of prison under s
ome sort (if
supervision (perhaps to work on the bread truck etc.) a
nd obtaining
frequent reports by those in daily contact with him. I can recal
l one
prisoner, one of the longer stay prisoners in New South Wa
les, who got out
by that process as people became more conﬁdent of him.
Finally. I would like to emphasise again the importance
of asking
patients about their dangerous conductvlf you do not d
o that you make
mistakes, but some psychiatrists do not like doing it. I rece
ntly saw a
young woman who had been threatening to kill somebody
over many years,
I asked her how she would do it and she said she would
shoot; I asked if
she had a gun and she said: “I bought one two months
ago”, which
changed, the complexion of the whole story.
'
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COMMENTARY
. H. F. Pumell, Q.C., LLB,
Senior Public Defender for New South Wales
Firstly may I commend Mr Tomasic and Dr Lucas on their respective
papers. What have I learnt from them? I believe two salient things:
1. " that those charged with the onerous responsiblity of assessing
dangerousness invariably err on the side of pessimism and as a result the
subject, if released, is let out later, rather than earlier than he should be,
and
2. the process of evaluation of dangerousness is far from expert, even
when done by psychiatrists with experience ‘in the field and by those on-
whom the responsibility falls in the criminal justice system.
I am in agreement with the paper writers that it is probable that too
much reliance is being placed on the traditional assessors. Nevertheless, I
would pose the" obvious question, who else is there to decide this highly
' difﬁcult, if not impossible problem? In this regard I feel that psychiatrists in
particular are a little too hard on themselves and their capacity to judge. I
doubt if there is any other body of experts with a better record for obtaining
the confidence of those they examine. l have noted with interest Dr Lucas’
statement that the patient quite often provides a valid opinion as to his
problems and displays foresight in predicting the risk he poses in his future.
I,certainly know of no other class of persons with a better capacity for
able prediction in this ﬁeld than the psychiatrist, especially when he has the
real confidence of his patient.
In saying that, I would agree with Dr Lucas that some people clearly
telegraph danger signals - these are those who are obviously very dangerous
(even to the layman) both in terms “of the likely harm that will be done
and in the probability that it will occur.” Ever since this Institute held its
seminar on the suggested amendments to the Mental Health Act,* I have
remained impressed by the sincerity of those psychiatrists who spoke that
night about the problems of release and of the obvious heart burning
associated with value judgements in this area.
Unfortunately the public are afﬂicted by the total misconception that
judges, magistrates, lawyers and doctors are over-zealous in their desire to
release so called “dangerous” people. They are not helped by the press with
the aura of sensationalism it creates in writings dealing with bizarre and
highly unusual conduct. I never cease to be amazed at the sort of headlines
which appear when a person who can be regarded as a borderline risk,
breaks down on release. On the other hand, the same journalists write
articles castigating' the type of strict security found by experience to be
necessary to hold proven violent offenders with explosive temperaments. It
is seldom that the press emphasises that the spectacular “break down” is a-
 
"‘ See Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. Proposed Amendments to the NS. W. Mental Health/
Act (1958/, No. 22 (Government Printer, 1975).
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comparatively rare event. Have you ever heard the press in the case of gaol
escapees claim that the individual is not a danger to the public? Over and
over again the assertion is made that “the police regard the escapee as
dangerous". I have had some knowledge of some of these people and with
the very greatest respect to all concerned, found little of the true quality of
dangerousness about them inconsiderate, futile, avaricious, yes, but
dangerous no. Nevertheless it is small wonder the more trepidant members
of the public become apprehensive.
Broadmoore as I understand it, houses some of the most dangerous
people in England. A recent article by Dr K. Walshe-Brennan, Psychiatrist,
disclosed that over 100 patients are discharged annually from that
institution. Most go to a psychiatric hospital or a hospital for the mentally
handicapped. Of these only about 10 per cent revert to some sort of
violencel. These ﬁgures are perhaps a little higher than those quoted by Mr
Tomasic in regard to Kozol’8 Massachusetts study.
I have rallied to the side of the psychiatrists, despite Mr Tomasic’s
valid criticism of some aspects of the science of psychiatry. I too would
agree with Professor Norval Morris that “we need better processes for
determining dangerousness”. Again I would echo the sentiment that there is
too much apprehension displayed by those charged with the responsibility
for release, but I would assure all, that the protection of the community is
not something I for one moment seek to cast aside.
The process of so-called “preventive detention” has at all times been
anathema to me. It is appreciated that it has existed in a number of
countries for some years. The State of New South Wales in a series of
decisions, rejected the concept.2 Unfortunately, with the advent of the
defence of “diminished responsibility” in cases of murder, the Court of
Criminal Appeal appears to have sanctioned preventive detention in this
State and clearly over-ruled the old authorities. It has been claimed that life
sentences for manslaughter in such cases can be desirable in the public
interest and afford appropriate protection to the public. An analogy has
been drawn with the situation in England and it has been pointed out that
the Home Secretary in that country has wide powers of release. The strong
suggestion has been made that our administrators are in a similar position
and that the Life Sentence Committee and the Parole Board can be relied
upon to be just. Before now, I have expressed the view that I‘ am not
satisﬁed with such arguments. One could ﬁnd a situation where a
psychiatrist who is a consultant to the Crown has said an accused had no
defence of diminished responsibility and yet against that expert’s opinion,
the jury returned a verdict on expert evidence given for the defence, of
manslaughter. The Crown’s consultant is then in a very difﬁcult position.
1. Justice of the Peace Vol. 141 No. 2 ‘p. 19.
2. R. v. Langley (1970) 92 w. N. (N.s.w.),917.
3. R. v. Veen — Unreported decision Court’of Criminal Appealof 6.8.16.
*v
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The jury-have found that the accused’s responsibility is diminished despite
the consultant to the Crown saying it isn’t. The Crown's consultant will
invariably be called upon to express an opinion at some time about the
question of release, perhaps on parole. It would be understandable if, for the
purposes of safety he erred on the side of pessimism. In this type of
situation, the views expressed by Mr Tomasic in his paper (p. 17) have real
relevance.
As I see it, the increased incidence of violence in our modern
community is going to place a heavy additional burden on those engaged in
the process of release. We are all familiar with the vociferous demands for
longer and longer incarceration. I believe, as Dr Lucas does, that “reviews
of progress will demonstrate that many persons considered dangerous,
present much less risk than originally thought." (p. 34)
\
Again, I would emphasise that it is my view that psychiatrists
underestimate their capabilities, but would agree with Dr Lucas that the
literature largely deals with persons clearly psychiatrically ill, “whereas the
psychiatrist who works at any level in the criminal justice system often has
to' assist in the :assessment of people who have no significant history of
psychiatric illness, but who have committed a serious offence or show what
are considered to be serious personality problems.”( p. 33)
Perhaps the most importantrecent work affecting our subject has
been 'done by the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders. The
Committee submitted its report on lst October 1975. Amongst the 140
recommendations of the Butler Report is the concept that primary
responsibility for the care and custody of dangerous anti-social psychopaths
should not rest with the penal system. Another is that special units for
them should be developed because psychopaths are not in general treatable,
at least in medical terms. In its three years intensive study the Butler
Committee examined how offenders are brought before the courts and the
relevance of their conditions to the degree of criminal responsibility.
I mentioned earlier that few of those discharged from Broadmoor
reverted to violence. It is of interest to note that the Butler Committee
decided that: “there is no way which would be acceptable in a civilized
society by which the public can be absolutely assured that no one released
from an institution will ever commit a violent crime subsequently. ”
One clearly realises the difficulties that beset the authorities in their
_work of attempting to assess the crisk faCtor remaining in the case of
dangerous offenders. Endeavouring 'to do something practical, authorities in
the United Kingdom recently started an experimental unit for violent and
disruptive persons at Barlinnie Hospital, Glasgow. The first inmates were
three murderers and a bank robber and the prime motivation was to break
down the traditional hostility between prisoner and prison ofﬁcer and-to
induce a sense of community responsibility. The result —- a complaint from
the Scottish Prison Officers’ Association that the inmates were given
privileges not available to other prisoners who had not behaved so badly.
For those charged with assessing and predicting dangerousness, the
road ahead looks only slightly less rough than that already travelled.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
H. I". Pumell, Q.C.
For the purpose of this exercise it would seem that dangerousness
really centres on the ever-present problem of the protection of the
community from persistent or potential'offenders. Looking at the excellent
papers presented by Mr Tomasic and Dr Lucas it seems clear that there is a
consensus amongst the informed that the prediction of dangerousness is a
somewhat unscientiﬁc exercise. Mr Tomasic has queried the competence of
psychiatrists and those associated with the criminal justice system to
effectively predict just who will prove to be dangerous. I have submitted to
you in my commentary that I feel that psychiatrists are better equipped
than any other section of the community to predict and to assess in this
ﬁeld, and are more likely to gain the confidence of those they examine than
most. This is a most important matter in my View. The practical problem
of assessing an individual whether he has a clear mental illness or, as Dr
Lucas has pointed out, is just a little peculiar, is a difficult one indeed and
it takes a great deal of expertise in my humble opinion.
I have no doubt whatsoever that Mr Tomasic was right when he wrote
(page 20) that those charged with assessing the individual, invariably, I
stress invariably, err on the side of pessimism and, in my experience, this
results in unnecessarily long periods of confinement for some and, I stress,
for some who do not need it. But generally I think that it is clear that
those who have this monumental task of assessing and predicting are ultra
cautious, too cautious probably. However, not everybody will agree with my
view.
I found it interesting to hear Dr Lucas reiterate that people with long
histories‘of violence are remarkably frank in asseSsing their own foibles and
are invariably willing to discuss, even with lawyers, what they fear most
from the point of view of repeating gross anti-social acts. There is a danger
that people stand off and look at the heinous nature of the offence and
pay too little regard to the individual, and do not try- to understand what
motivates people or see what can really be done to prevent a repetition of
serious conduct.
l have very strong views that this whole problem of dangerousness is
somewhat over emphasised. I know that not everybody is going to agree
with me, particularly the press and the media generally. They create a great
deal of noise and furore about people and I think they create a fearful
state in various members of the community when this is not always
necessary. I said in my commentary that it was unusual to hear the radio
or television refer to gaol escapees as other than “violent and dangerous”. I‘
have to moderate that statement because only this week I heard on the
radio that the five people who had recently escaped from Cessnock were
not regarded as dangerous. I might say that that is the first time I have
ever heard that type of statement. In my view, and I have seen a number
of these people, not all of them are dangerous by any means.
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I would like to refer again to the matter of preventive detention (see
page 43.). This State now appears to have accepted that a successful defence
_of diminished responsibility to a charge of murder, resulting as it does in a
verdict ‘of manslaughter, can lead to the imposition of a life sentence. We
all know that a life sentence is available in the case of manslaughter, but
certainly in my experience, and 1 think the records support it, it is most
unusual for somebody to be sentenced to life having been convicted of
manslaughter. We have no legislation in this State of the nature that has
existed in England for many years, but the view is now abroad that, when
in doubt, having in mind the safety of the community, impose a life
sentence. The person thus found guilty of manslaughter will ﬁnd himself in
no better position that if he was convicted of murder. The courts are going
to place the responsibility for deciding who is to be released, and when, on
the Life Sentence Committee of this State. I appreciate that the Life
Sentence Committee has been making such judgements over very many
years, but the position is somewhat different in England. We have been
hearing that the situation is analagous to England. There, of course, the
decision is made by the Home Secretary and he makes that decision on a
wealth of advice. I appreciate that the Life Sentence Committee here has its
advisers, but from what I can ascertain they certainly do not have the
depth of information that is available in England. I put to you the sort of
situation that could well arise: you have ’a person who has been found
guilty of manslaughter because he is of diminished responsibility, he is a
person who fundamentally is either brain damaged or perhaps retarded, he
may not have come to notice or may not have done anything very serious
at all during the period of his life until, his conviction for manslaughter. It
seems to me that that person may well ﬁnd himself in a position, if
- sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, less favourable than a person
who was very mad and very dangerous at the time he killed somebody but
by reason of the nature of his mental illness was found “not guilty” on the,
grounds of mental illness. Through expert psychiatric help he may make a
signiﬁcant recovery, whereas the person who is retarded or brain damaged
will be within the prison system for a period much greater than the person
who in essence was convicted of murder.
I do not want it to appear that I am not greatly concerned about the
safety of the community generally. No one knows better than I do that
there are a number of people within the system who are, to use an
American term, very “mean” indeed. However, as a practicing lawyer, I am
very concerned about the situation where there is a clamour in the
community for ever increasing sentences. A section of the community has
been very vocal about this. I would not like to see us return to he
situation so long ago that Gerald Gardiner referred to, where it was
common to see pickpockets. present at the hanging of a fellow pickpocket
— they certainly'were not there for the good of their health but they were
there to ply their ‘trade. I have no illusions at all that locking people up
and keeping them there indeﬁnitely is..an answer to the problem of
dangerousness.’ I do not need to tell you that the periods of conﬁnement
prescribed in this State are heavy indeed. They are probably as heavy if not
heavier than anywhere else in Australia. It would be a pity if those who are
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vocal are able to convince the authorities that what we need is to lockpeople up and keep them locked up; to detain them rather than endeavourto treat them. ‘ '
The matter that I mentioned in regard to preventiVe detentioninvolved a case some while ago and the Court of» Criminal Appeal'has saidhere that in their view it is appropriate in certain cases, not all cases, wheresomebody is found guilty of manslaughter to impose an indeterminate lifesentence. In fairness I should repeat that the Court of Criminal Appeal in
New South Wales has very recently said again that that is their view. But I
would also point out that the Butler Committee in England concernedthemselves with the type of problem that we are discussing. They concluded
that there is no way which would be acceptable in a civilized society bywhich the public can be absolutely :assured-that no one released from an
institution will ever commit violent crime subsequently. So, if there are no
clear assurances are we to say: “Well let’s lock them up and keep themlocked up?” '
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I COMMENTARY
'Dr W. A. Barclay, M.B., B.S., M.Sc., 0.11M, F.A.N.Z.C.P.,
. Consultant Psychiatrist
In some ﬁfteen or sixteen years of being Director of State Psychiatric
Services, or its equivalent, I was rarely asked to assess dangerousness. l was
frequently asked to assess the presence or absence of mental illness within
the terms of the Mental Health Act, and, of course, in doing that dangerous
behaviour was an issue but the fact is that the Act in that sense does not
often ask ofﬁcial psychiatrists to say anything about dangerousness or to
predict dangerousness. It simply asks them to say whether the person is
mentally ill or not, and once you say they are not mentally ill you can
either let them out or send them back for someone else behind closed
doors to make the difficult decision. It is obvious that we must involve
ourselves far more in the process than that.
One of the problems that all psychiatrists face is, as Dr Lucas has
pointed out, that none of us has very much experience in this area. It does
not arisethat often, so far as a psychiatrist is concerned, except with
respect to suicide. We all have a fair amount of experience in assessing our
own individual patients with respect to potential for killing themselves, but
that is a different ball game to the one under discussion which is predicting
with individuals their propensity to be dangerous to others. 1 agree with Mr
Tomasic that we need to deﬁne dangerousness. When you are asked to
make an assessment like this, it really ought to be made clear to you by -
those who make the request what they want you to tell them: what sort of
dangerousness they want you‘to assess. Is this man likely to commit murder
again? ls this man likely simply to be violent? Is he likely to lose control
and commit another sexual offence? Is he likely to rob again? Is this
woman likely to bash her baby again and what can be done about that?
What exactly is meant?
It is true I think that we tend to over emphasise the dramatic crimes
and under emphasise many of the much more malignant elements of
dangerousness in our community. If Sara Williams, a child psychiatrist, was
here she would be talking about malignantly dangerous parents 'who are
emotionally dangerous to their children, and who bring them up or treat
them in such a way as to permanently distort their personalities. She has
been pressing for years for some sort of preventive detention for children to
protect them from their parents.
Where I have had to assess'dangerousness I have worked out my own
guidelines. Firstly, in an official position, you are influenced by the
‘bureaticratic pressures. I suppose one cannot help but think of the risk to
the whole of the mental health system when one is making a decision as to
whether to let someone out or not. There are a few people around
regarding whom the thought went through my head "I am not at all sure
that one should take the risk of letting this guy out.” For example, where
someone had committed a number of very serious offences or a number of
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murders and this was likely to occur again, you may feel that the risk is
too great to take. How does one assess this risk? I suppose the thing that I
personally look for is the lack of concern on the part of the individual
being assessed. A lack of emotion about what had been done, a lack of
guilt if you like, a lack of conscience, and added to this sometimes actual
enjoyment, a relish in describing the events and a history of previous sadistic
or dangerous behaviour for the purpose of experiencing pleasure. As Dr
Lucas has properly pointed Out if you ask people they will often tell you.
Did you enjoy it? Do you get fun out of it? Is this what turns you on?
and quite often you can 'offer to people situations for them to experience
in fantasy and they will quite clearly tell you that that is the sort of thing
that they like doing. They may be turned on, but then I get a sort of cold
chill down my spine and feel that this represents someone who is
potentially dangerous. He actually does enjoy the, sort of behaviour for
which you are trying to assess his potential.
I do not think that the system as a whole in New South Wales, asI
have known it over 20 years, is ultra cautious. I think we have learnt that
we are subject to a lot of unreasonable pressures and unreasonable
expectations. I had the feeling over those ﬁfteen or twenty years that most
commonly the people who committed homicides (that is perhaps the most
outstanding piece of dangerous behaviour that causes the most publicity)
had not been assessed as being mentally ill before The dangerous behaviour
came as a surprise. Indeed, where the person had previously been a
psychiatric patient there was often no indication in his record that this was
a dangerous person or that this matter had even been looked at — it came
again as a surprise. I think we should address ourselves to what we are
going to do about this in the future.~ We obviously cannot continue
bumbling along in this way. The most useful suggestion [have seen in this
matter is the one made by Morris and Hawkins in The Honest Politician’S'
Guide to Oime Control (University of Chicago Press, 1970) where the
suggestion is made that we should do something about constructing the
equivalent of morbidity or mortality tables to begin predicting dangerous
behaviour. I have been turning that over in my mind ever since I read it
because it seemed a useful idea.
I think it should be possible to improve what we now do. We could
begin by a retrospective study of selected groups of people who have
performed dangerous acts, either those who committed homicide or select a
particular class of offences, look back through the material and see what we
can ﬁnd out about them. I do not doubt that this has been done before.
We could then begin a prospective study by attempting to codify and
standardize the information and data that is collected. Since several of us
have agreed that none of us has very much experience about this, perhaps
we could get to the stage of agreeing that we all record the same data, ask
the same questions in some standardized way, and that we actually record
the data on which we base our decisions. We might even be persuaded to
write down the reasons for our decisions in an ofﬁcial record so that
prospectively some assessment can be made of our predictive ability. I do
not think that any of that is beyond our power to’ do now within the
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framework of the system as we have it. There are a number of us Who
examine prisoners either for the defence or the prosecution and I think
some standardization of the data we collect about people ought to be
attempted. .If we do both retrospective and prospective studies at least in
‘ time we will have a body of data on which we may begin to prepare the
type of predictive tables'referred to by Morris and Hawkins. Of course, the
ﬁrst thing that we must do is to define dangerousness.
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COMMENTARY
Mrs Jean Floud, CB.E.,
Principal, Newnham College, Cambridge.
Chairman, Committee on Dangerous 0ffenders(U.K.)
Let me begin by .saying that I entirely accept Mr Tomasic’s main
contentions about the concept of dangerousness. He entitled his paper ”The
Dangerousness of Dangerousness” and it is plausible, I think, to speak ‘of
the concept itself as dangerous, since it carries an inherent threat to civil
liberties. Bentham deﬁned danger as “the chance of pain or, what comes to
the same thing, the loss of pleasure”; but “dangerousness” is a term which
inspires special fear, calling by implication. for unusual protective measures
which entail more or less drastic consequences for the liberty of those to
whom they are applied. If someone is labelled “dangerous” the message is
self-evident: one is entirely justiﬁed in taking such measures against him.
So, of course, liberals resist the right of the State to deﬁne people (as
distinct from behaviour or events) as “dangerous”. Undoubtedly, the
deﬁnition of dangerousness, as Mr Tomasic has said, is a social, a political
and not a scientiﬁc exercise; and it is a politically dangerous concept for
the reasons that he gave.
With all these points I agree. But I must add that I do not think it
follows that the concept is, in principle, unjustiﬁable. It does not follow
that it cannot be deﬁned and applied with rationality, objectivity and
impartiality. If, as a political concept, it is liable to reflect the bias of the
prevailing distribution of social power, that does not make it ipso facto a
dispensable concept - other arguments, of a different kind, are required to
prove that proposition. And it is not the case that all the bias and
distortion that can be detected in its deﬁnition and use at a particular time
necessarily serve the interests of the powerful in their relations with the _
powerless. More often than not, in my view, all that can be said is that
they serve their convenience, which is neither sociologically nor politically
at all the same thing. Moreover, they just as often serve the convenience of
the man in the street.
Mr-Tomasic makes telling points which demonstrate the arbitrariness
of our present usage and application of the concept “dangerous” to
conduct. He is right to stress a truism; behaviour is socially defined as
harmful -— it is not intrinsically so. But since great social changes are taking
place today, it is not surprising that our received deﬁnitions of harmful
behaviour are looking threadbare and in need of overhaul. Our socially
approved or accepted manifestations of violence, for example; should they
continue to include manslaughter on the roads? Mental anguish has acquired
a new status at the hands of the psychiatrists as a cause of psychological
harm; how can we protect ourselves? Privacy, likewise, is an interest under
scrutiny in face of modern threats; are traditional defences adequate? Noise
and industrial litter are being upgraded, in the light of modern scientiﬁc
knowledge, from social nuisances to social dangers; are the existing
protections adequate? — And what about the protective measures
themselves? We have run the gamut of those directed by the criminal justice
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and law enforcement system against individuals from the gallows, through
mutilation and imprisonment, to behaviour ~ modiﬁcation
psycho-pharmacology and electronic monitoring devices. How do we assess
the social costs of these modern methods, to set against the modern harms
against which we want to be protected? The costs, of course, represent the
‘sacriﬁce of values: for example, the inviolacy of the person and the
personality, or, some notion of the communal good, or simply material
resources. Every generation reworks the utilitarian calculus with fresh
assumptions about what is harmful. Every generation looks for an account
or a deﬁnition of the kind and degree of likelihood of the kind and degree
" of harm which will justify taking certain measures to prevent it. And no
generation, in making the utilitarian calculation, escapes the interfering
‘ 1 problem of justice.
We are today facing the need for new deﬁnitions of dangerousness to
take account of changing opportunities for and inéentives to gravely harmful
behaviour. This raises the question: for what kinds of grave harm is the‘
criminal justice system the appropriate protective device? (For example, is
there a case for turning some torts into crimes because the harm that is at
issue, though grave, does not fall in such a way that ‘any individual has an
interest or the means to bring an action?) What measures of protection can
the criminal justice system offer against those harms that it properly and
reasonably undertakes to tackle? (For example, how much of all the
illegitimate violence that plagues modern cities can be prevented by penal
measures directed against individuals?) These are utilitarian questions; but‘
what about the crosscutting questions of justice? Do our protective
measures work equitably as between different kinds of offender? (Mr
Tomasic, for example, claims, I think reasonably, that we incline to
'victimize the mentally disordered whilst tolerating the manslaughtering
motorist and are .careless with the civil rights of offenders termed
dangerous.) ‘
I, think'these general points are of great interest and importance. But
if the answer to the questions of utility. about the scope and efﬁcacy of
the criminal law in face of modern harms is that it is an overrated
protective device, both in the range .of harms that it can appropriately
tackle and in the impact it can make on the extent of those harms, I think
we should not necessarily jump to the conclusion that we should
immediately dismantle its operation — though we might do well to try and
slim it down and rationalize it. If the answer to the question about justice
is negative then, of course, we must strive to correct injustices; but we
must be careful what we are doing. We may cease to victimize the mentally
disordered and decide to deal with the manslaughtering motorist — but not-
by a simple switch of penalties. Will ﬁnes and short ﬁxed terms of
imprisonment serve for the mentally disordered? Are we sure about life
' sentences for motorists?
I take the trouble to make these .obvious points because I want to
draw attention to an undercurrent of assumptions which I detect in Mr
Tomas'ic’s paper; and to the fact, as it seems to me, that he does hot
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indicate clearly to what conclusion he is pointing with his argument that
dangerousness is an invalid concept. Are we to understand that it is also an
unnecessary concept?
I come now to much more mundane stuff, the task which is facing
my committee.‘ Of course, we are anxious to acknowledge all aspects of
the problem. Our terms of reference are deceptively simple: we are simply
asked to review English law and practice relating to dangerous offenders. We
agreed at the outset that we could not take the notion of dangerousness for
granted. We want very much to defuse and broaden the notion, in the way
that Mr Tomasic advocates, to give it a more realistic content to accord
with modern conditions; and we want to encourage the reevaluation of the
protection offered by the criminal justice system in the light of the
magnitude of the social problems to which it is directed and the costs of
all kinds, that is to say the moral, political, social and economic costs, that
its application entails. But we have a prime task, a hard core, as you might
say, to our brief, which I should like to put before you as a way of
drawing out some implications of our discussion about prediction and
assessment of dangerousness.
We have to examine the deﬁnition and the handling of dangerousness
in socalled “normal" offenders. More precisely, we are dealing with the
theory and practice of identifying, sentencing and managing high-risk,
serious offenders, whatever their mental state, providing only that they do
not come within the terms of The Mental Health Act 1959 (UK). That is
to say, providing that they are not definable as mentally abnormal and
whom be consigned, therefore, to a special hospital. Who are these
offenders? I can only really call them “non-abnormal” offenders, because as,-
you will see their definition as “normal” begs many questions. At any rate,
who are these “non-abnormal” offenders?,What is their present fate at the
hands of the law?
They can be grouped into three broad classes, as follows, and all are
to be found in the prisons. Firstly, there are those who have been
convicted of certain non-homicidal offences for which the life sentence,
although not mandatory, _is available to the court and who have in fact
been given a life sentence. In practice, they will only have'been given a life
sentence because they have a history of mental disorder or because they
give other evidence of mental instability such that the court is persuaded
that there is a likelihood of their committing further graver offences.
Secondly, we have those who. are in much the same mental condition
but who have not committed an offence for which the life sentence is
available and are therefore serving fixed. term sentences. Some of them in
fact have spent some time in Broadmoor but have been returned to prison
‘ The Committee was set up in May, 1976, by the Howard League for Penal
Reform and the National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of
Offenders, in consultation with the Home Ofﬁce, on the initiative of the
Academy of Contemporary Problems, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A. The Academy is
arranging, as part of its Social Justice Programme, under the direction of Dr
John Conrad, for studies of the problem of “the dangerous offender“ in a
number of countries.
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as being not susceptible to treatment. All of them have either been refused
[parole or have themselves refused to opt for parole, and on release they
therefore will probably have had little experience of pre-release socialization
schemes.
Thirdly, there are other serious offenders ‘who show no special signs
of mental disturbance but whose record decides the court to provide a
period of protection for the public by sentencing them for longer periods
of imprisonment than would be usual on‘other grounds for the offence in
question: that is to say, a sentence which is outside the normal range but
within the permitted maximum for that offence. It is worth noticing that a
high proportion, if not a majority, of this category of “dangerous
offenders” are convicted of non-violent offences to property. Needless to
say, the protective element in their sentences is not made explicit, though it
is not unusual for the adjective “dangerous” to be applied to them by the
court: “You are a dangerous man" etc. .
My committee is following hard on the heels of the Butler Committee
on the mentally abnormal offender. The Butler Committee was very
troubled about the failure to make special provision, for example in secure
psychiatric hospitals, for the second of the three classes of dangerous
offender I have just described. That is to say, those serving fixed-term
sentences in the ordinary prisons who must be released at the end of their
sentences, though as the Butler Report puts it “they may be as dangerous
as ever they were”. The Butler Committee saw here what they referred to as
“a serious defect in society’s defences which ought, so far as possible, to be
put right”. They were unable to say what was the size of the problem
presented by these offenders in terms of reconviction rates; but they
propbsed‘an alternative to the life sentence for them in the shape of a
reviewable sentence, of which the essential feature is the statutory insistence
on regular review at which the case for further detention, rather than the
case for release, has to be made. It also incorporates compulsory
post-release supervision and regularreview; and the sentence is intended to
be served under a special regime in so called “training units”. ~‘
. How seriously is my committee to take this alleged gap in society’s
defences? Are we to follow Butler and accept the reviewable sentence? And
what about the other two cateogires of offenders at present treated as
dangerous? Are we to recommend the abolition of the life sentence for
non-homicidal offences? (It is not within our terms to argue about the life'
sentence for homicidal offences.) Are we to advocate restricting the courts
in their discretion to include a protective element in ﬁxed-term sentences
for serious offenders who are deemed high risk on account of their record?
Alternatively, as is at least foreseeable, though I cannot pretend it is
imminent, if there should be a move to make quite drastic cuts in the
maximum sentences permitted to the courts over the Whole range of
sentences, are we to provide against the day by recommending that in those
circumstances provision should be made for extended terms for high-risk
offenders convicted of certain serious offences, the extended term being for
the protection of the public and explicitly not for the punishment of the
offender? '
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The need to decide on these issues, which I have very rapidly
sketched for you, brings us face to face with the nasty problems drawn to
our attention by Mr Tomasic and by Dr Lucas about the inherent difﬁculty
of predicting human behaviour, and about the disputed role of the expert
in this ﬁeld, the forensic psychiatrict. We have discussed} this in the
committee - I won’t say ad nauseam, but very nearly.
I do not agree with Mr Tomasic that there are no fur
ther
improvements that are possible on this front. The study of
recidivism, it
seems to me, has not so far been directed speciﬁcally to our pro
blem. That
is to say, it has not been directed specifically to t
he deﬁnition or the
identiﬁcation of subgroups of offenders with high recidivism rates.
Attempts
to make the necessary subdivisions have been half hearted;
they have the
most part been by-products of other enterprises. It se
ems to me not
unreasonable to expect that research designed with this aim wo
uld make it
possible to identify groups, probably small in number, with recidivis
m rates
that would justify treating members of them as prima
facie recidivists.
However, I must acknowledge the dilemma of decision _m
akers in the
meantime. They must either minimise the total numbe
r of mistakes by
treating all dangerous offenders, all violent and all sexual
offenders, as
non-recidivists, suspecting all the time, as they must, that the
y will include
some deﬁnable higher risk groups (if only they could get
at them); or they
must decide that certain offences are so harmful that
it is justiﬁable to
impose restraints on whole groups of which, on the
best information
available, only a minority will actually repeat the crime.
A great deal of workhas gone into demonstrating the impossibility of
certainty in attributing dangerousness. Nevertheless, we must
do more to
improve our actuarial work and, as I have said, I am not as
pessimistic
about the possibility of doing so as Mr Tomasic. But we must
also
recognize that not nearly enough work has gone into solving
the no less
complicated legal problem of pursuing legitimate social
objectives in an
ethical mineﬁeld.
As to the forensic psychiatrist I, like one of the other commentato
rs,
detected a masochistic streak in Dr Lucas’ character and I am incli
ned to
' defend him against himself. A great deal of energy has gone into‘ cuttin
g
the forensic psychiatrist down to size. Not enough has gone into decidin
g
how to use his skills once he is cut down to size. We can all agree
that a
psychiatrist is to a layman, in judging the propensities of his fellow
men,
much as the meteorologist is to the farmer in judging the weather. B
ut let
us not throw away skill simply because we have made the mista
ke of
leaning too heavily on it, and have found it not only Wanting
but
susceptible of abuse. . - ‘ '
l have one further point on which I am as yet not entirely clea
r and which
I would be very interested to hear discussed. It seems_t_o
be the case when
the same information is being used by clinicians and s
tatisticians, the
statisticians make the fewer mistakes. Does it follow that we sh
ould prefer
statistical to clinical methods of assessment of offenders? I
am not sure;
though I confess I have not got my grounds clear. There
seems to be
something inherently or, at least, potentially more just abo
ut personalized
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assessment. (To take a ridiculous example: suppose I am a person who
repeatedly starts ﬁghts and that [am prima facie very likely to go on doing
so. It seems to me that even a psychiatrist might notice that I happen to
have been permanently disabled in my last ﬁght and so, whatever the
statistics say, should be put in the category of the lowest risks.) -
,In conclusion, it seems to me that the points before us in these
papers are welltaken; but I am left in the dark as to the advice that is by
implication being offered to my committee. Clearly Mr Tomasic would like
‘Parliament to disown the term “dangerous” as they have already disowned
stigmatic labels of other kinds such as “lunatic” “idiot” or “imbecile”. He
would like them to disown it in the "way the Butler Committee has
- recommended that they also disown the term “psychopa'th”. I suspect that
he ‘would‘ also ‘like us to recommend the abolition of indeterminate
sentences, on the grounds that prediction is impossible. Would he also want
us to say’that protective (as against punitive or denunciatry or therapeutic)
measures against serious offenders should not be taken on the presumption
of~ high risk, in the absence of arithmetical justiﬁcation which we deﬁnitely
at the moment do not have? Finally, what role in all this would he give
the forensic psychiatrist, once suitably cut down to size?
‘1
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DISCUSSION
Dr R. F. Barr, Senior Lecturer in Psychiatry, University of New South Wales.
Consultant Psychiatrist to the Department of Corrective Services
We have heard a lot tonight about the question of cutting down
forensic psychiatrists to size, but I would like to comment on Mr Tomasic’s
statement that violence can only be predicted accurately in 3 per cent of
cases. I find this an extraordinary statement and very difﬁcult to believe. If
psychiatrists operated purely by tossing a coin as to whether the person was
going to be violent or non-violent they would have to be correct in
approximately 50 per cent of cases. As it is, I suspect they are accurate in
far more than 50 per cent of cases because, after all, the prediction of
violence is often not very difﬁcult. To take two very extreme examples:— if
one was asked to see a seventy-five year old nun whose only delinquency
was forgetting to pay her bus fare it would be perfectly easy to guess that
she would not behave violently in future. 0n the other hand, the young .
male with a long history of impulsive and aggressive behaviour and perhaps
a number of convictions for violent behaviour will predictably behave
violently in future. I do not know if Mr Tomasic has any ﬁgures for New
South Wales on Life Sentence prisoners or Governor’s Pleasure prisoners
who were discharged from prison, and whether or not they do in fact
behave in the opposite way from the prediction of the psychiatrists, as he
would allege in 97 per cent of the cases.
Another point I would like to take up from Mr Tomasic’s paper is
that it is “invariably assumed” that people who attempt suicide are
mentally ill. I feel that Mr Tomasic may have misunderstood the psychiatric
literature in this ﬁeld. Probably the best known study of attempted suicide,
that by Stengall, made the opposite point. Stengal pointed out that the
great majority of people who attempt suicide are not mentally ill but are
reasonably normal people in a life crisis or people who have had too much
to drink who impulsively make an attempt on their life, not so much to
end their life, but as a cry for help.
The third point which I would like to take issue with Mr Tomasic is’
his statement that there is no correlation between mental illness and
violence. I do not think that that is true. For example, among alcoholic
men who develop the syndrome of pathological jealousy towards their wives
or their girl friends it is well documented that they do tend to make
violent assaults on their wives or girl friends, and that they tend to repeat
those assaults. Again, it is well known that among temporal lobe epileptics
with a history of disorganised and sometimes violent behaviour immediately
following their fits there is a high risk of violent behaviour, perhaps only of a
minor nature, following such epileptic fits. Another example is that of the
paranoid schizophr'ianic person who in spite of illness maintains a high drive
level, a high energy' level, lively emotional responses and refuses to
co-operate with psychiatric treatment, and at the same time actively plans
I. Stengal, E. Sufclde and Attempted Suicide Penguin Books Ltd., 1964.
 
 58
revenge against supposed persecutors. In such a case the very great majority
of psychiatrists would predict that there was indeed a risk of future
'violence and in at least a proportion'of cases, I am sure far more than 3
per cent, their prediction would be correct.
Roman 'Tomasic
The 3 per cent ﬁgure comes frdm a Californian study by Wenk and
others2 which found that when they attempted to develop a successful
scale for predicting dangerousness the scale was successful only in 3 per
cent ‘of cases which had previously been deﬁned as dangerous. I think that
is a different point from the point that you made, in my example it was
the particular scale that was not found to be successful in anything more
than 3 per cent of cases of this type. This was the most drarriatic ﬁgure I
could ﬁnd and I selected it deliberately from a number of studies (see
pages 18 and 19 for other studies). The point I make is that scientiﬁc
attempts to predict dangerousness failed rather drastically though other less
scientific methods may well be, though I doubt it, more successful. I may
be unduly pessimistic, as Mrs Floud and Dr Barclay have pointed out there
obviously are many attempts to develop uniform criteria to predict
dangerousness. One particular major study currently under way "in the
United States is firmly based on the belief that it is possible to develop
means of determining the risk of certain offenders, and I think that there is
a plausible case to be made for developing fairly uniform criteria. However
my reading 'of the literature leads me‘to be far more pessimistic.
In the attempted suicide area, I accept that Stengal, ShneidmanS‘and
many others have talked about “the cry for help” as being an integral part
of most suicidal behaviour and not mental illness, but, on the contrary, if
one looks at the Australian literature on suicide you will ﬁnd an implicit
assumption in virtually all fifty studies published in the last twenty years .
that mental illness is an integral component of attempted suicidal
behaviour.4 The very fact that approximately'25 per cent of inmates of
psychiatric institutions are attempted suicides infers that there is an implicit
assumption that mental illness is involved;
2. Wenk. Robinson, 1.. and Smith, G. “Can Violence be Predicted?" Crime and
Delinquency 18 : 393 at 402 (1972) (see my reference number 23).
3. E. S. Shneidman & N. L. Farberow (Editors) Clues to Suicide, McGraw-Hill, N.Y.
1957; N. L. Farberow & E. S. Shneidman The 0y for Help, McGraw-Hill, N.Y.
1965.
4. See for example: Buckle, R. C., Linnane, J. & McConaghy, .N. “Attempted
Suicide Presenting at the Alfred Hospital Melbourne" Medical Journal of Australia
I : 754 at 757 (1965); Edwards, J. I‘.. & Whitlock, F. A., “Suicide and
Attempted Suicide in Brisbane” Medical Journal of Australia 1 : 993 (1968);
Gold N., “Suicide and Attempted Suicide in North-Eastern Tasmania” Medical
Journal of Australia 2 2 361 at 362 (1965); James, P., Derham, S. P. & Scott-Orr,
D. N., “Attempted Suicide — A Study of 100 Patients Referred to a General.
Hospital" Medical Journal of Australia 1 z 375 at 377 (1963); Krupinski, .I.,
Polke, .P. & Stoller, A., “Psychiatric Disturbances in Attempted Suicide and
. Completed Suicide in Victoria during 1963” Medical Journal of Australia 2 : 773
(1965).
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In regard to the correlation between mental illness and violence, I
think it depends upon the group being studied. The proposition that I put
forward is that it is assumed that there is a correlation between mental
illness and dangerous behaviour rather than violence. There is a difference.
Joan b'llard, Member of the New South Wales Parole Board
Mr Tomasic’s ability to search out provocative aspects of the subject
is again manifest in his paper. One could ﬁnd, as Mrs Floud did,
philosophic discussion in virtually every paragraph but I am going to
conﬁne myself to a few of the many points which interested me.
As a Parole Board member [ am one ﬁfth of a “gatekeeper”, to use
Mr Tomasic’s very apt phrase, there being ﬁve members of the New South
Wales Parole Board. The Parole Board acts as gatekeeper only with those
persons whom the courts have given non-parole periods. They are not the
, gatekeepers, as they are so frequently accused of being, of life sentence
prisoners or of personsf‘not guilty but detained on grounds of mental
illness”. It is true in these cases that the Board is asked to report its
opinion to the Minister and in such a report, having summarised as many of
the known variables as possible, a recommendation is made.‘I must say that
experience in recent times is that not every favourable Parole Board
recommendation has been acepted and that His Excellency the Governor
and the Minister concerned have kept the gate shut. ,
On the question of non-parole period releases, without canvassing
again the complex issue of parole, the Board ﬁnds that what is now
fashionably called! “dangerousness” does arise as part of our parole
consideration, but it is my opinion that this present Board translates this
problem by asking the question, “If we release this man or this woman at
this stage will we be putting someone’s life or their physical or mental
comfort into jeopardy?" On page 20 Mr Tomasi'c says:
“Because of criticisms by the media and higher authorities that are
made of predictors who underpredict it is unlikely that the predictor
will do otherwise than ‘play it safe’ and overpredict massively
because, after all, he would face a threat to his power by under-
prediction, and incarcerated offenders are little threat to this power
should he overpredict.”
I have reread that several times and I find that this statement is one'of Mr
Tomasic’s more provocative predictions. In my opinion he is referring to 'the
New South Wales Parole Board. I would venture to say it is. an
overprediction. ‘
In the current climate of criticism from civil libertarians and such
journalists as those who work for radio station 2]] and for the
Fairfax-Murdock press stable, were the Parole Board to “play it safe” we
might be moved to release automatically without any consideration of
h 
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criminal record, social history, psychiatric assessment or post-release plans.
However, [would predict that the current Board will continue to look at
each case as _. it comes on its own merits. In looking at each case as it
comes, the Board is interested in the area discussed by Mr Tomasic on page
16 which he calls “violence-prone situations”. The Board considers this area
most carefully in post-release planning, and the Board would hesitate or
refuse to release say, for example, the incestuous father back to the .bosom
of his family or the paediphiliac schoolmaster back to his classroom. Even
the best citizens, in my opinion as a lay person, have a situational breaking
point —‘ for myself imprisonment would be the catalyst in my breaking
point. For some people we know that the situational breaking point is
marriage, perhaps at the end of an affair; lately for some people in New
South Wales the violence prone situation is the football ﬁeld. As an
example (or an anecdote) in this State we have a gentleman who murdered
a nagging, domineering'wife. He spent many years in prison, liked by one
and all. On his release, trying his level best to avoid it, he was manouvered
back into matrimony by another nagging, domineering woman with the
predictable results. I have long regarded wife number two at least as a case
of suicide, an area which I know Mr Tomasic has a special interest in. In
this case our man was certainly in a “violence-prone situation” but,
whatever we want to call the quality of his personality or of his situation,
he did what he did and the ladies were dead. I am sure that there are
many victims of nagging, domineering wives who accept their fate without
violence!
I agree 'wholeheartedly with Mr Tomasic’s views on many of the
schemes for personality measurements and I do look forward to the day
when students of human behaviour work under the heading of “behavioural
arts” rather than the “behavioural sciences”. Nevertheless, if students of
criminal behaviour continue to look at the offence history of their subjects
they cannot avoid seeing that sometimes major crime follows minor crime,
sometimes minor crime follows major crime. This is where the tremendous
responsibility of prediction comes in. When a man has been imprisoned for
beating his wife and you have the responsibility of releasing him, as the
Parole Board does, you can opt out and say that there is a ‘fixed period
after which he will be released anyway, or you can play it “Will they kiss
and make up?" when he goes home, or will he be able to answer the age
old question “Have you stopped beating your wife?”, or will he go
home and beat_her to a pulp so that'she becomes a coronial investigation?  
SomeorE-‘has—to take the-responsibility for intervening or not intervening.
I have just raised these points because I think we could bog down in
philosophic discussion, but decisions do have to be made and, in my
opinion, this is what the Parole Board is doing. What other “gatekeepers”
are doing,- what the Minister is doing, I do not know but we have to ask
.the question “Is this person going out to hurt someone or do we have a
good parole service that will ensure that no one will suffer?”.
I thank Dr Lucas and Mr Tomasic for their stimulating papers because
they .both reinforce a number of my views. Is it not an easy game — there
are .many questions and very few answers.
‘
_
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 Roman Tomasr‘c 1
I did not have the New South Wales Parole Board in mind specifically
when I wrote the paragraph quoted. I am quite prepared to recognise, and I
think it is an important fact, that obviously you do have an important
responsibility, though I also look at another factor. For example, a recent
Scottish study of the work of the Parole Board there compared recidivism
rates of those who were paroled and those who were not paroled‘and the
figures were remarkably the same. There was virtually no difference between
the recidivism rate of the two groups of persons. It is difficult to say
anything about New South Wales because so little research has been done
here but there are other studies of overseas jurisdictions which seem to
suggest that other interpretations can be made to support the view 1
advanced in my paper. I‘ would urge the need for some further study here
to examine the work of the Parole Board and recidivism rates similar to
some of the studies that have occurred overseas.
Dr W. E. Lucas ' ‘
Some of the material of course that goes to Life Sentence Committee,
of which I am a member, and to the Parole Board and on to the Minister
originates from forensic psychiatrists. I' have the opportunity quite often to
look at the ﬁles of prisoners, to re-read some of my old reports as well as
the reports of other people. I do not want to comment on Parole Board
decisions, as I am in the very fortunate position of not having to make
decisions about the release of prisoners, -l have only to provide information
to help the decision makers. One thing that does concern me is the quality
of the material that reaches the decision makers. I' will modestly refuse to
comment on the quality of my own reports, some of which on re-reading
do not always delight me, but I do see a lot of psychiatric reports written
by other pSchyiatrists. What does concern me is that these reports are
frequently used by authorities such as Parole Boards, administration and so
forth for reasons other than that for which they were designed in the first
place. A report written to assist a court in sentencing is not necessarily a
particularly good document on which to base a decision about release or
about whether the person is likely to repeat an offence. Neither is a report
written fifteen years ago reviewing a person in a particularly difficult
situation likely to help you assess how he is behaving in a quite different
situation. Reports that have been summarised by a variety of people are not
uncommonly misinterpreted and occasionally misquoted. I can think of one
example where the quote substituted 3 full stop for a comma and left off
the qualifications the psychiatrist had added to his remark. I am not quite
certain how to overcome these problems. Up-to-date reports are very
important. old reports should be assessed by psychiatrists who are writing a
new report rather than used to support a point of view. \
Another aspect involving psychiatrists in- providing material for
decisions concerning release is that the psychiatrist at times needs to
virtually refuse to give an opinion saying:
“This is not a psychiatric problem. I have reviewed the ﬁle, I have
spoken to the prisoner and I am afraid you are going to have to work
it out for yourselves”.
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On occasion, too, a psychiatrist who knows a prisoner very well may
indicate that he does not wish to write a report on him. On a number of
occasions I have felt I have known the prisoner too long, I wrote his
pre-sentence report, and I have certain ideas about him which I feel may
introduce bias, so that I suggest that someone else should read all my
papers and prepare a fresh report, but I refuse to pass an opinion.I think
that people other than psychiatrists should, at times, also withdraw from
decision making situations on particular individuals.
Another problem is the question of individuals, often with sexual
problems, particularly those people who offend persistently against boys in
their early teens, who may receive repetitive heavy prison sentences but no
one looks at the question of treatment which is the only way to avoid such
repetitive heavy prison .sentences. These offenders are usually non-violent
. offenders but rather persistent.
There‘is another mystery that I am frequently confronted with and
that is the element of punishment in the sentence particularly in the case
of Life Sentence prisoners and Governor’s Pleasure prisoners. I have never
really worked out what period should be allocated to “punishment” in
these cases, but I know that in New South Wales such prisoners seem to
spend more time “inside” than in other jurisdictions.
Finally, I should mention that although we, are not very good
predictors, occasionally one has a rather shaking experience of very accurate
prediction. Recently when [heard the news of a quite horriﬁc crime I knew
instantly who had done it, and I was perfectly correct.
.Dr G. A. Edwards, Medical Superintendent, Parramatta Psychiatric Centre
Dr Barclay spoke about the system not being particularly over-cautious
in New South Wales. Certainly it is ﬁne in regard to non-criminal patients
in hospitals. Twenty years ago at Parramatta there were many ﬁles of
people who were not under any sort of criminal charge marked
"never-to-be-released”. A perusal of some of those ﬁles today indicates that
many of our past colleagues were certainly very cautious in the way that
they assessed the risk of dangerousness. Also statistics show that in those
years, there were about 1600 patients in the hospital, today there are less
than.500 patients. The reasons for the drop in numbers are due to other
factors such as other alternative facilities but it also does reflect the fact
that psychiatrists are not as conservative as they used to be in assessing
dangerousness; Of course, there are many people, particularly relatives, who
feel that some‘of the patients should still be in hospital!
- Dr W. B. Grant, Government Psychiatrist
I was grateful to Mr Tomasic for raising the issue that‘dang‘erousness
'may be an attribute of a situation rather than of an individual. I wonder,
however, if this is taken to an extreme in some instances. For example, in
family therapy and certain kinds of group analytic therapy the extremist
will see anything that an individual does in a family or in a group as
expressing only something for the group. The individual’s behaviour is not
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examined as being particular to that individual, but is only seen as
expressing the fears, hopes, or other emotions on behalf of the group.
Interpretations, assessments etc. are made only on that basis. This seems to
me to be extreme and absurd. One has to wonder why that particular
individual, at that particular point in time, was selected, or allowed himself
to be selected, by that particular group of individuals to carry out that
particular piece of behaviour.
p Whilst i can see value in the issue that Mr Tomasic has raised 1 would
like to ask him whether there is the possibility of reaching that rather
extreme position in which we overlook characteristics in the individual
himself?
Mrs J. Melville, Member of the Life Sentence Review Committee
I would like to clarify the position of the Life Sentence
Review
Committee, it does not have the power which I seem to read into some of
the comments; it makes recommendations. The information that does come
to us we feed through to the Parole Board. '
Comment has already been made on the need for sufﬁcient
information to be brought forward in order that a valid prediction might be
made. I think this is all important, and quite often we are guilty of not
having sufﬁcient information. Mr Purnell noted that the depth of
information brought forward to the Home Secretary is much greater than
that information which is brought forward to the Life Sentence Review
Committee. I would be grateful if he could enlarge on the degree and depth
of this information.
Mrs Jean Floud
Mr Purnell has asked me to answer for him. The Parole Board receives
the contents of a dossier which would. comprise a wide range of opinion
from everybody who has had any contact with the prisoner: for instance a
social worker, prison chaplain, prison ofﬁcer, prison governor, psychiatrist,
notes from the Local Review Committee, and soon. A very wide range of
opinions. not in any systematic form, is presented, and the job of the
Parole Board is to evaluate this and then to make a recommendation to the
Home Secretary.
At present an experiment is being conducted by the Home Ofﬁce, not
of giving reasons to prisoners for the withholding of parole, but of asking
the Parole Board to formulate the reasons for its decisions. This is proving
extremely difﬁcult. The experiment is in process; but they have before
them an heterogeneous mass of information and though they may reach a
unanimous view, the reasons are apt to vary and are not always
reconcilable. My Committee is very interested in seeing whether the
evaluative work that they do can be rationalised. Everybody acknowledges
the impossiblity of standardising assessments which can only be based on
the intuitive evaluation of diverse opinions and various amounts of available
information; but we are seriously considering what can be done to make for
a more controlled and informed use of intuition. Can assessors be provided
c
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with a standard range of considerations essential to a fair and balanced
judgement‘lThe feasibility of such a suggestion will partly depend on the
outcome of the current experiment .on the Parole Board’s capacity to give
reasons. As I have explained, they may agree on a recommendation, but not
agree on the reasons for arriving at it, because of the heterogeneous mass of
information before them. So you cannot compare decisions very readily; it
is‘folk memory inside the Parole Board and on the part of the ofﬁcials that
counts. This is something that my Committee is worrying about.
Mrs J. Melville
You said that social workers were amongst the host of other people
‘ putting forward information on which the Parole Board made its decision.
'Are these social workers specialists in the particular ﬁeld of dangerous
offenders? '
Mrs Jean Floud
No, they would be probation ofﬁcers and they would also be social
workers in the locality'from which the offender came and to which he
might be returning. There would be a variety of reports from different
kinds of social workers, generic social workers and probation ofﬁcers but
not from social workers specializing in dealing with any particular class of
offender.
H. F. Pumell, QC.
My readings also suggest, as Mrs Floud has said, that there is no
systematic organisation of this material. The real beauty and value of it is
that they call on a wide variety of people and get the benefit of some
perhaps unusual, but very helpful opinions. It is not standardized. We live
in a system here where the Life Sentence Committee, as I understand it, is
very much bound by material coming from accepted and usual sources. I do
not think it is wide enough, and I am concerned that with the use of the
indeterminate sentence there may 'be such stresses on the Life Sentence
Committee that some of the decisions will be almost impossible to make.
Dr W. E. Lucas
One very regrettable thing here is that the opinions of prison ofﬁcers,
who are in constant contact with prisoners who are being considered, do
not reach the Life Sentence Committee or psychiatrists who write in reports
in the sort of form that Mr Purnell seems to think is most useful. In a
number of cases I- have asked that written reports, not standardised reports,
by prison ofﬁcers who know the prisoner be forwarded to me and these
have been most revealing. A man that no one fully trusts is out on the
bread truck or some such job,vand the prison ofﬁcers will write about his
conversation and his reactions. This sort of information can be eXtremely
helpful but information about a prisoner’s conduct from the people who
know him best is very hard to obtain. There is no regular way of doing it
and I consider this is a grave deﬁciency. .
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R. P. Roulston, Director, Institute of Criminology
As a member of the Life Sentencing Committee I would like to add
my support to both Mr Purnell and Dr Lucas. The information that we are
getting seems clearly inadequate and it appears to me that from time to
time that a lot of it is positively misleading and, as Dr Lucas has said,
rather dated by the time it is considered.
John Parnell, Justice Department
Mrs Floud posed the problem of how best to pursue “legitimate social
objectives in the ethical minefield”, and in doing so indicated there had
been some recent research in England that had discovered some sub-groups
with a high recidivism rate. I recall that some years, in the time of Home
Secretary Jenkins, in the area of police investigation there was a trend
towards tracking and predicting offenders rather than waitingfor offences
to occur, and this had a marked success rate. Does Mrs Floud know what is
the current situation with regard to this trend? What is Mr Tomasic’s view
for the future for such a trend in this country if the research has been
successful? Finally, on another aspect, would Mr Purnell comment on the
future of the Mental Defective Convicted Persons Act which seems to be
the sole surviving means of preventive detention?
Dr J. A. Steedman, Community Psychiatrist.
l have been in community psychiatry for fifteen years either in Canada
or in Sydney, and I would like to support the comments of Dr Barclay and
Dr Edwards. I do not think that we err on the side of being conservative
or over concerned in committing people to hospital. Community psychiatry,
at present, is the “in thing”, and most people are being treated in the
community, but you just cannot do that with dangerous people who the
moment they get into gaol or hospital are no longer dangerous. I do not
know how you do studies on predicting dangerousness if they are carried
out on a group of people, many of whom are no longer dangerous.
However, the person who is dangerous does have to return to the
community, and meeting and talking to someone whom I consider
dangerous in the home situation is often not very pleasant. While I am
gazing down the end of a shot gun I have to make out I am being helpful,
and the nurses, social workers and psychologists have to work with these
dangerous people in the community.
There is of course, tremendous pressure on you. ~For example, a
fortnight ago I interviewed a very violent man one day and this experience
inﬂuenced the judgement I made with a similar person two days later.
Again, there is the pressure of the community itself on the nurses and
other workers. We do see a lot of dangerous behaviour, and do not really
know what we can do about it.
Jim McKnight, Psychologist, Parramatta Gaol
I am concerned that very little mention has been made of the role of
psychologists in the corrective system in New South Wales. There are only a
few of us, and we carry, to a large extent, the burden for counselling and
treatment of prisoners in New South Wales. I would like to ask the
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psychiatrists to utilize us a lot more readily. Often we are the point of
contact between the prison ofﬁcers, other workers in the gaol system and
the prisoners, and I think we do have a degree of information that could
be utilized by the psychia_tris_ts_. Psychologists in the Corrective Services are
. more numerous than psyéhiatrists, and we can spend a much longer time
with each inmate. Also, rightly or wrongly, the prisoner officers see us as
being more, approachable than psychiatrists. We work in the gaols and are
seen to be frequently around. I feel that due to our greater degree of
contact and also our greater approachability we can give some of the
behaviourial information on the prisoner.
J. M G. Callaghan, Stipendiary M_agistrate
In my dealings with patients in mental hospitals I invariably have a
ﬁle with clinical notes, and most psychiatrists would have access to clinical
notes for anybody who has either been seen by them privately or been in a
mental hospital. Would it be possible for similar notes to be made by the
‘ psychologists as far as the prisoners are concerned which might be available
not only to the psychiatrists but to the Parole Board or to any other
person who may beneﬁt by looking through them? It is not always
administratively easy to see people in gaols, they may have been shifted to
another gaol, they may be otherwise occupied or on leave etc. but with
access to ﬁles plus the psychologists’ and other relevant information it would
. be possible to- build up a picture that would be helpful.
' Jim McKnight .
Certainly psychologists can be there to report, but I feel our greater
- contribution is working in collaboration with parole officers, with
', psychiatrists and with other people that have the decision making capacity.
We can provide information on an informal basis. Personally I do not see the
role of psychologists in gaol as primarily one of assessment, but of counselling.
'David Herbert, Acting Director Trafﬁc Safety, Department of Motor Transport;
My question has been raised by Mrs Floud and concerns the charge of
manslaughter in relation to trafﬁc accidents.
I would like to mention a particular case to make my point. A very
young car driver knocked down and killed an elderly pedestrian who had
run across the road- in front of him. The driver was not drunk but he was
convicted for manslaughter and sentenced to ﬁve years imprisonment. The
whole question of the culpability of the pedestrian not only was not argued
in Court, but defending counsel told me it could notpossibly be argued in court
because under the jury system the defendant would have been “gone”.
My point is not just that the culpability of the other party apparently
is not argued, but that the whole idea of a driver being dangerous on our
roads offends me considerably, because more often it is the roads that are
dangerous and not the driver. The roads are constructed by the community
'and notby the individual who is forced by law to use them.
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Mrs Jean Flora!
May I first make a correction to the first question: I did not say that
research had successfully identiﬁed sub-groups of offenders with high
recidivism rates. That is an objective that we should pursue; such sub-groups
have not been identiﬁed except for property offenders — not for violent or
serious sexual offenders. But my View is that research directed speciﬁcally
towards that end should be able, contrary to Mr Tomasic’s view, to identify
such groups. On the assumption that such sub-groups had been identified,
what would be the implication of research which indicated that community
measures by the police were successful in reducing recidivism on the part of
offenders? If I have understood this question correctly, the answer would
be that sub-groups with high recidivism rates would change over time; it
would be a natural consequence of effective community measures on the
part of the police that they would be reﬂected in the ﬁgures.
In regard to the second question, about death by dangerous driving, as
far as the United 'Kingdom is concerned the focus of the law, as I
understand it, is not on the death but on the driving, that is to say‘ on the
offender‘s behaviour, the careless or dangerous driving, rather than the fact '
of death’which is a consequence of that. The result of focusing on the
driving with the incidental consequence of causing death is that you could
be responsible for even multiple deaths on the highway and the maximum
sentence of imprisonment would be ﬁve years. The norm is much more like
l8 months or less — which, of course, is a very different proposition from
any penalty .for a directly homicidal offence. If you took very seriously the
numbers of deaths attributable to-dangerous driving and you were to change
the focus of your legal action, it might be possible to rectify the sort of
inequity that Mr Tomasic referred to i.e., the inequity that arises when
violence in one context is tolerated for all sorts of reasons, some of which
were tentatively advanced by the questioner, whereas in other areas it is not
tolerated and the penalties are very much greater. There is an inconsistency
which amounts to inequity there which should be looked at, if one is
seriously concerned‘with dangerousness as a threat to life and limb. But if
one were addressing the question of how to account for public tolerance of
high death rates on the road, then one would have to begin by the sort of
argument that the speaker has advanced and proceed over a wide range of
public attitudes. This would be an extremely interesting exercise but I will
not even attempt it here. The point I wanted to make was that if we take
dangerousness seriously, we might very well look at the consequences of
dangerous driving on the roads.
Dr W. A. Barclay
I would like to comment on Mrs Ellard’s remarks where she described
very eloquently the problem that people have who are faced day by day
with the responsibility of making decisions regarding other people. She
described the use of the clinical approach, i.e., where one puts together
with respect to a single individual as much information as can be collected
and on the basis of the best available information related to one’s own past
experience attempts to classify these people in some way. This particular
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person looks like all those other people with this particular disorder or this
particular syndrome. This is what we can predict about what is likely to
happen. This is the clinical approach. We all use the clinical approach in
making this type of decision and I think we will continue to use it until
some alternative is available. Once a deﬁnitive test comes forward for a
disease and we can say with certainty that this test means he has got that
disease and this responds to ‘Y’ antibiotic, then the clinical approach tends
to become less important because our predictive ability is nearing 100 per
cent. But, as all clinicians know, there may be other factors and, as Mrs
Floud pointed out, you neglect the clinical approach at your peril. Even the
psychiatrists may notice that a man has lost a leg and is unlikely again to
kick anyone to death, at least with that leg!
I want to refer again to the suggestion made by Morris and Hawkins
(see page 49) as I believe it is very important, and am surprised that it has
not been taken up, i.e., the attempt to make available to the clinicians
better data on which they can base their predictions..This after all is the
business insurance companies are in, in assessing risk for life insurance
policies. We have to try and begin to do the same with respeét to the
prediction of dangerousness. We can say to the Parole Board the man who
fits into this category on the basis of our prediction has one chance in 10
of committing murder again, or he has one chance in 200. A clinical
decision still has ‘to be made unless we bring in a law which says that if
you fit‘ into this category you do not get let out. All I am suggesting is
that we need to do more work in putting together the data so that we can'
provide better information for the people who have to make clinical
decisions, and here I would support my colleague, the psychologist. When I
go to see a prisoner sometimes I get access to the clinical notes, but I
never get the sort of information that we have talked about at this seminar.
We need to work on that and do something about it.
a. F. Purnell, Q.C..
In answer to John Parnell the Mental Defectives Convicted Persons
Act is still at large. I did my best to suggest that it was anachronistic
some while‘ago but without success. I also endeavoured to persuade the
, Court -of Criminal Appeal that' the' Habitual Oimz'nals Act was also
anachronistic but they would not accept that either. As you can see I am
very much against indeterminate sentences.
~ Dr W. E. Lucas
Part of the'problem of working in prisons is that the flow of
- information is stagnant. Psychiatrists come and go very quickly in prisons,
thus it can become very difﬁcult to get the exchange of information.
Reports are written on very little information- at times. Some time ago I
wrote a report and some people found my remarks about the referral
offensive but they did not enquire about the source of my information. I
had received it from a variety of rather informal and reliable sources.
Prisoners often give good information about themselves and about other prisoners.
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(‘onccrning prediction and psychiatrists, psychiatrists are in a key
position because often we do have the time to talk with people, and we
can always refer to other psychiatrists who may have more expertise in
particular areas. It increases our sensitivity to other information.
One of the problems about information in prison is that
conﬁdentiality is a total myth. Psychiatric reports are disseminated so
widely and so frequently that one becomes very careful about what one
writes down — I imagine psychologists feel the same.
In many cases the decisiOn to release a prisoner must be a political
one. and I am not above saying to a prisoner “Who do you know who can
start bothering the local Member and the Minister about this?” because it
does force consideration of very difﬁcult cases. I have got nothing against
the sort of agitation that has taken place recently on behalf of some
prisoners. It forces people to make difﬁcult decisions.
Roman Tomasic
Could I make just one brief point in response to the query from Dr
.Grant? Certainly by no means Would I suggest that we take extreme views.
However, I think that it would be fair to say that despite the assurance .of
Joan Ellard that the Parole Board does take into account social factors in
making its decision I think it could quite plausibly be argued that when
decisions are made the crucial factor is invariably the individual factor
rather than the social situation. David Herbert I think mentioned that it is
rate, for example, in the motor trafﬁc situation for roads to be seen to be
dangerous rather than the driver, and I think the same situation applies here.
I wonder, and this is something I am not totally sure about, how important
ultimately a decision is made upon the basis of the environmental
circumstance of the individual. I am not suggesting that this be the only
factor that is looked at in decision making, but I think it is a factor that
has been greatly ignored.
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